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臺大管理論叢
第
26
卷第
2
期
23
(2)
Tax-avoidance = CETR
(3)
Tax-avoidance = BTD
Spec = IPS Spec = IPS_D Spec = IMS Spec = IMS_D Spec = IPS Spec = IPS_D
(1.64)
(1.61)
(0.73)
(0.71)
(0.72)
(0.68)
0.0171***
0.0165***
0.6999***
0.7049***
0.7050***
0.7106***
(15.71)
(15.63)
(45.71)
(47.00)
(46.05)
(47.98)
0.0875***
0.0880***
0.2038
0.2028
0.2043
0.1959
(6.05)
(6.09)
(1.01)
(1.00)
(1.01)
(0.97)
-0.0416
-0.0416***
1.5411***
1.5361***
1.5525***
1.5496***
(-6.76)
(-6.76)
(17.81)
(17.74)
(17.94)
(17.90)
0.0150
0.0153
0.2996
0.2968
0.3129*
0.3049
(1.09)
(1.12)
(1.56)
(1.54)
(1.67)
(1.58)
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
Controlled
7692
7692
7692
7692
7692
7692
26.09
26.97
128.40
128.26
128.42
127.99
0.1029
0.1025
0.3677
0.3674
0.3677
0.3669
expertise and tax avoidance in the Big 4 samples separately. Table 9 presents the main
results. It seems that the positive association between auditor industry expertise and tax
avoidance is still there, but the coefficients of interactive variables are not significant in most
of these regressions, which means that the Big 4 were less affected by independence problem
compared to other audit firms.