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臺大管理論叢

26

卷第

2

21

CETR

) is more negative when auditor independence is lower. The coefficient of the

interaction between

Spec

and

Fee

(

Tenure

) is positive and statistically significant in Model

(3), which means that auditor industry expertise is more positively associated with book-tax

difference (

BTD

) when auditor independence is poor. To summarize, the reported

coefficients of the interactive variables are uniformly consistent with H3 and indicate that

industry experts are more likely to use their industry expertise to help clients engage in tax

avoidance activity, especially when auditor independence is poor.

Results on control variables suggest the following patterns. There is a positive

association between audit firm size and clients’ tax avoidance in Table 8. Corporate efficient

tax rate (

BETR

and

CETR

) is positively associated with

Size

,

Roa

, and

CFO

, and negatively

associated with

Lev

. Corporate book-tax difference (

BTD

) is positively associated with

Size

and

Lev

, which means firms with bigger size and higher leverage are more likely to engage

in tax avoidance activity. The regression results of control variables are basically consistent

with previous researches.

(2)

Tax-avoidance = CETR

(3)

Tax-avoidance = BTD

Spec = IPS Spec = IPS_D Spec = IMS Spec = IMS_D Spec = IPS Spec = IPS_D

-0.2110***

-0.1982***

2.2271***

2.1474***

2.1766***

2.0427***

(-8.92)

(-8.61)

(6.70)

(6.56)

(6.54)

(6.30)

-0.0049

-0.0079

0.8818*

0.1997**

0.3796*

0.0144

(-0.35)

(-1.17)

(1.81)

(2.28)

(1.92)

(0.15)

0.0062

0.0097

0.0912

0.2051

0.0750

0.1711

(0.37)

(0.58)

(0.39)

(0.90)

(0.34)

(0.72)

-0.0001

-0.0004

0.0211***

0.0183***

0.0147**

0.0171***

(-0.28)

(-0.80)

(2.90)

(2.79)

(2.18)

(2.64)

-0.6320**

-0.1122***

9.4932***

1.3349*

12.5783***

0.9830*

(-2.48)

(-2.72)

(2.65)

(1.77)

(3.52)

(1.70)

-0.0086*

-0.0072*

0.1479*

0.0311*

0.0472*

0.0317*

(-1.90)

(-1.89)

(1.68)

(1.66)

(1.77)

(1.66)

0.0025

0.0003

0.1448***

0.1452***

0.1460***

0.1634***

(0.91)

(0.19)

(3.66)

(3.80)

(3.72)

(4.49)

0.0044

0.0043

0.0275

0.0269

0.0271

0.0256