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臺大管理論叢
第
27
卷第
2S
期
271
fired and want to stabilize earnings and reduce risk to protect the job security of new CEOs.
This result rejects Hypothesis 3. The results of corporate governance variables and all control
variables are very similar to those in Table 3.
We next investigate the interaction effect between CEO turnover and organizational
structure whether resulting in change in reinsurance demand in Table 6. Model ∆Reins_ratio
presents that the coefficient of the interaction term between CEO turnover and mutual
insurers is negative and weakly significant, suggesting the positive relation between CEO
turnover and change in total reinsurance ratio is weakened for mutual insurers. This result
rejects Hypothesis 4.
Table 5 Regressions of Reinsurance Demand on Voluntary CEO, Forced CEO vs.
Non CEO Turnover
Dependent variables
∆
Reins ratio
∆
Reins_aff_ratio
∆
Reins_nonaff_ratio
Independent Variables
Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value
Voluntary CEO (t-1)
0.006
0.818
0.000
0.998
0.006
0.521
Forced CEO (t-1)
0.061***
0.001
0.048**
0.012
0.013*
0.058
Mutual (t-1)
-0.005
0.940
0.014
0.830
-0.019
0.417
Duality (t-1)
-0.052***
0.006
-0.042**
0.028
-0.010
0.143
∆ Board size
0.001
0.851
0.000
0.944
0.000
0.747
∆ Independent director
0.029
0.486
-0.003
0.950
0.032**
0.035
Big 4 auditor (t-1)
0.006
0.779
-0.002
0.917
0.008
0.286
∆ Ln(na)
-0.278***
0.000
-0.289***
0.000
0.011
0.463
∆ Herfindahl
0.017
0.843
0.066
0.458
-0.048
0.124
∆ Geoherfindahl
-0.467***
0.000
-0.483***
0.000
0.015
0.684
∆ Leverage
0.023
0.843
-0.179
0.129
0.202***
0.000
∆ Underwriting risk
-0.295***
0.000
-0.212***
0.008
-0.082***
0.004
∆ 2yearLossDevelopment
0.088**
0.013
0.136***
0.000
-0.048***
0.000
∆ Coastal prem
-0.357**
0.016
-0.301**
0.046
-0.056
0.296
∆ Long-tail
0.246***
0.008
0.232**
0.013
0.014
0.673
∆ Tax_ex
-0.022
0.396
-0.024
0.348
0.003
0.777
∆ ROA
0.067
0.655
-0.023
0.878
0.090*
0.096
Group (t-1)
0.013
0.702
0.027
0.426
-0.014
0.240
Intercept
0.032
0.625
0.023
0.721
0.008
0.729
Hausman Test
14.80
13.63
28.52
R-Square
0.087
0.085
0.122
N
2,772
2,772
2,772
Note: The table shows the regression results of reinsurance demand on voluntary CEO, forced CEO
vs. non CEO turnover (reference variable). “
∆
x
” means change in
x
. Specifically it sugggets that
∆
x
i,t
means
x
i,t
minus
x
i,t
-1
. Please see definition of all variables in Appendix A. ***significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.