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美國產險業
CEO
更迭與再保險需求
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Model ∆Reins_aff_ratio in Table 8 shows that the coefficient of interaction term
between forced CEO turnover and mutual insurers is significant and negative. This finding
suggests that mutual insurers with forced CEO turnover are more likely to purchase less
reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers after CEO turnovers. This result is similar to that of
interaction term between non-routine CEO turnover and mutual insurers. The explanation is
similar, and thus, we will not provide further details. The interaction term between voluntary
CEO turnover and mutual form is not significantly related to reinsurance demand. The
results of others variables in Tables 7 and 8 are very similar to those in Table 6 with one
exception. Duality becomes insignificantly related to reinsurance from non-affiliated
reinsurers.
Table 9 shows the regression results of change in reinsurance demand on CEO turnover,
organizational structure and corporate governance variables with SOX Act. In all Models, we
find the interaction effect between CEO turnover and SOX are not significant, suggesting
that new CEOs do not change their reinsurance decisions after SOX. The interaction term
between SOX and CEO/chairperson duality is negatively and significantly related to change
in total reinsurance ratio and affiliated reinsurance ratio, implying that insurers with CEO/
chairperson duality tend to purchase less total reinsurance and reinsurance from affiliated
reinsurers after SOX. We also find that the interaction term between SOX and change in
percentage of independent directors on the board is negatively and significantly related to
non-affiliated reinsurance ratio post-SOX. One possible reason is that increasing the number
of independent directors can serve as external monitors to transfer risk, suggesting insurers
with higher percentage of independent directors on the board are likely to purchase less
reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers to reduce reinsurance cost after SOX. This result
rejects Hypothesis 5. The results of control variable are similar those in Table 3.
Table 10 reports that the regression results of change in reinsurance demand on routine
CEO turnover, non-routine CEO turnover vs. non CEO turnover, organizational structure and
corporate governance variables with SOX Act. Table 11 also presents the interaction terms
among forced CEO turnover, voluntary CEO turnover
vs
. non CEO turnover and SOX. In all
Models, we find the interaction terms of CEO turnover (routine, non-routine, forced, and
voluntary CEO turnover) and SOX are not significant, suggesting new CEOs from different
types of turnover do not change the reinsurance decision after SOX. The results of corporate
governance and control variable are similar those in Table 9.