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美國產險業
CEO
更迭與再保險需求
270
Table 4 Regressions of Reinsurance Demand on Routine CEO, Non-Routine CEO
vs. Non CEO Turnover
Dependent variables
∆
Reins ratio
∆
Reins_aff_ratio
∆
Reins_nonaff_ratio
Independent Variables
Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value
Routine CEO (t-1)
0.019
0.426
0.025
0.314
-0.005
0.530
Non-Routine CEO (t-1)
0.059***
0.003
0.036**
0.067
0.022***
0.002
Mutual (t-1)
-0.009
0.887
0.012
0.858
-0.021
0.370
Duality (t-1)
-0.050***
0.008
-0.041**
0.032
-0.009
0.173
∆ Board size
0.000
0.893
0.000
0.979
0.000
0.764
∆ Independent director
0.033
0.434
-0.001
0.982
0.033**
0.026
Big 4 auditor (t-1)
0.007
0.753
-0.001
0.953
0.008
0.299
∆ Ln(na)
-0.276***
0.000
-0.289***
0.000
0.012
0.395
∆ Herfindahl
0.017
0.843
0.066
0.456
-0.049
0.122
∆ Geoherfindahl
-0.479***
0.000
-0.490***
0.000
0.011
0.771
∆ Leverage
0.038
0.745
-0.168
0.154
0.206***
0.000
∆ Underwriting risk
-0.297***
0.000
-0.215***
0.008
-0.082***
0.004
∆ 2yearLossDevelopment
0.091**
0.011
0.139***
0.000
-0.048***
0.000
∆ Coastal prem
-0.365**
0.014
-0.307**
0.041
-0.058
0.281
∆ Long-tail
0.251***
0.007
0.235**
0.012
0.015
0.643
∆ Tax_ex
-0.023
0.358
-0.026
0.317
0.002
0.789
∆ ROA
0.072
0.632
-0.021
0.889
0.093*
0.086
Group (t-1)
0.011
0.741
0.026
0.446
-0.015
0.220
Intercept
0.029
0.655
0.019
0.768
0.009
0.685
Hausman Test
14.37
13.06
28.26
R-Square
0.087
0.084
0.126
N
2,772
2,772
2,772
Note: The table shows the regression results of reinsurance demand on routine CEO, non-routine CEO
vs. non CEO turnover (reference variable). “
∆
x
” means change in
x
. Specifically it sugggets that
∆
x
i,t
means
x
i,t
minus
x
i,t
-1
. Please see definition of all variables in Appendix A. ***significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 5 shows the results of the regression of change in reinsurance demand on insurers
with forced CEO turnover, voluntary CEO turnover vs. insurers without CEO turnover
(reference variable). We find that forced CEO turnover are positively and significantly
related to changes in total reinsurance ratio, affiliated reinsurance ratio and non-affiliated
reinsurance ratio. Voluntary CEO turnover are not significantly related to changes in
reinsurance decision. This result suggests that insurers with forced CEO turnover are likely
to have more reinsurance than insurers without CEO turnover. In general, insurers with new
CEOs resulting from forced CEO turnover are likely to have more conservative strategies
and purchase more reinsurance, because they are aware of the fact that their predecessor are