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臺大管理論叢
第
27
卷第
2S
期
275
Table 8 Regressions of Reinsurance Demand on Voluntary CEO, Forced CEO vs.
Non CEO Turnover with Interaction Effect of Organizational Structure
Dependent variables
∆
Reins ratio
∆
Reins_aff_ratio
∆
Reins_nonaff_ratio
Independent Variables
Estimate P value Estimate P value Estimate P value
Voluntary CEO (t-1)
0.003
0.932 -0.004
0.925
0.007
0.620
Voluntary CEO (t-1)
×
Mutual (t-1)
0.004
0.943
0.006
0.915 -0.002
0.918
Forced CEO (t-1)
0.087*** 0.000
0.071*** 0.002
0.016**
0.050
Forced CEO (t-1)
×
Mutual (t-1)
-0.079**
0.032 -0.070*
0.061 -0.009
0.497
Mutual (t-1)
0.026
0.701
0.042
0.543 -0.016
0.520
Duality (t-1)
-0.049*** 0.010 -0.039**
0.040 -0.010
0.158
∆ Board size
0.001
0.855
0.000
0.946
0.000
0.753
∆ Independent director
0.031
0.453 -0.001
0.988
0.032**
0.034
Big 4 auditor (t-1)
0.006
0.772 -0.002
0.923
0.008
0.284
∆ Ln(na)
-0.277*** 0.000 -0.288*** 0.000
0.011
0.460
∆ Herfindahl
0.021
0.813
0.068
0.439 -0.048
0.129
∆ Geoherfindahl
-0.467*** 0.000 -0.482*** 0.000
0.015
0.690
∆ Leverage
0.018
0.879 -0.184
0.120
0.202*** 0.000
∆ Underwriting risk
-0.296*** 0.000 -0.214*** 0.008 -0.083*** 0.004
∆ 2yearLossDevelopment
0.084**
0.018
0.133*** 0.000 -0.049*** 0.000
∆ Coastal prem
-0.361**
0.015 -0.304**
0.043 -0.057
0.291
∆ Long-tail
0.247*** 0.007
0.233*** 0.013
0.014
0.670
∆ Tax_ex
-0.019
0.451 -0.022
0.394
0.003
0.755
∆ ROA
0.056
0.710 -0.033
0.827
0.089
0.101
Group (t-1)
0.013
0.695
0.027
0.422 -0.014
0.242
Intercept
0.033
0.613
0.025
0.708
0.008
0.729
Hausman Test
10.56
11.94
24.95
R-Square
0.090
0.087
0.123
N
2,772
2,772
2,772
Note: The table shows the regression results of reinsurance demand on voluntary CEO, forced CEO
vs. non CEO turnover (reference variable) with interaction terms of organizational structure. “
∆
x
”
means change in
x
. Specifically it sugggets that
∆
x
i,t
means
x
i,t
minus
x
i,t
-1
. Please see definition of
all variables in Appendix A. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.