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79
臺大管理論叢
第
28
卷第
1
期
Applying Game Theory to Credit Guarantee Mechanism on
Supply Chain Sourcing Model
Summary
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) have a considerable macroeconomic impact
in most Asian and developing countries. According to the statistics for SMEs from the
Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taiwan, the rate of employment for SMEs accounts for
78 % of the total employment in Taiwan.
Generally speaking, an SME does not need a large amount of capital to establish
itself and it may not have sufficient working capital when it begins to process orders.
Money is critical for a firm, especially for SMEs—for example, it may be more difficult
for SMEs to obtain loans. As high risk and low profit borrowers, SMEs rarely manage to
obtain loans from financial institutions unless they have a considerable amount of credit.
Also, due to unhealthy financial/accounting systems which result to the risk of loaning,
SMEs are requested to provide collateralization as a guarantee when applying for financial
support. The supply chain activities involving the upper-stream suppliers and downstream
manufacturers are close. The suppliers are in lack of working capital or cannot borrow
sufficient money in time such that they may delay shipment or stop manufacturing. If
suppliers can’t meet the due date of the order, the entire supply chain will be shut down.
Therefore, this study is aimed to propose a credit guarantee mechanism to solve this
problem.
In the literature, several researches related to supply chain finance such as trade
credit are from the upstream firm’s perspective (Lee and Rhee, 2010; Chen and Wang,
2012; Chen, 2015). For example, Lee and Rhee take the supplier’s perspective and
implement a trade credit instrument to coordinate the supply chain (Lee and Rhee, 2011).
The supplier then offers the trade credit instrument to the retailer, such as a markdown
allowance or a risk premium. Thus, the supplier can do his/her best to improve the entire
supply chain. Chen (2015) compares trade credit with bank credit to realize that which
instrument is better off. In trade credit, the retailer is willing to increase order quantities
David Ming-Huang Chiang
, Professor, Department and Graduate Institute of Business Administration,
National Taiwan University
Cheng-Feng Wu
, Lecturer, School of Logistics & Engineering Management, Hubei University of
Economics, Researcher at Institute for Development of Cross-strait Small and Medium
Enterprises, Hubei
Ming-Shian Ye
, Master, Graduate Institute of Business Administration, National Taiwan University