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應用賽局理論探討信用擔保機制於供應鏈採購模式之研究
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because its marginal cost decreases; as a result, the profit of the manufacturer and the
retailer in the supply chain is better off under novel instrument. Li et al. (2014) implement
trade credit insurance as hedging strategy to manage fund lender’s loan risk. The authors
show that the relationship between trade credit insurance and interest rate is negative. The
fund lender and borrower are in win-win situation because of trade credit insurance. In our
study, due to the supply chain environment in general developing countries, this study
takes downstream firm’s perspective. Also, we implement firm’s credit as tool in supply
chain finance to establish a novel instrument, credit guarantee mechanism.
The credit guarantee mechanism in this study is stated as follows: one supplier, one
manufacturer, one retailer, and one financial institution are considered within the supply
chain. The manufacturer is a leader and guarantees that the supplier, who lacks working
capital, can secure financing from the financial institution with the assurance of the
dominating manufacturer. A leader-follower game is introduced in this paper, with the
upstream suppliers as followers, and the downstream manufacturers as leaders. Both sides
of parties are seeking to maximize profit and build up their supply chain purchase model.
Backward induction is applied to obtain the optimal decision and profit maximization;
additionally, this study presents a numerical analysis and shows the sensitivity analysis by
adjusting variables such as the failure rate for a supplier and the fill rate for a supplier in a
failure situation.
According to the results, we find that the failure rate of a supplier and lost sales of a
manufacturer is positive related. As the failure rate for a supplier rises to a threshold, the
supplier’s expected profit is negative. Thus, the supplier is unwilling to receive an order
from the manufacturer. Even if the manufacturer provides collateralization for upstream
SMEs, the credit guarantee mechanism filters the supplier through its operation.
Consequently, the supplier is assured to provide certain quantities in a supply chain and
the collateralization of the manufacturer is more valuable in the credit guarantee
mechanism.
The relationship between the failure rate for a supplier and the assessment rate of the
manufacturer is positive. As the failure rate of the supplier increases, the probability that
the supplier is unable to repay the financial institution is higher and the risk of the
financial institution increases. Consequently, the financial institution and the manufacturer
may negotiate higher assessment rate of the manufacturer to ensure that the financial
institution possesses enough incentive to lend money to the supplier.