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NTU Management Review
                                                               Vol. 34 No. 1 Apr. 2024, 45-90
                                                               https://doi.org/10.6226/NTUMR.202404_34(1).0002


               The Interrelationship among Normal and Abnormal D&O
               Insurance Coverage, Institutional Investor Characteristics and
               Audit Fees



               董監事責任險正常及異常投保金額、機構投資人特性與審
               計公費之關聯性


               Jiun-Wei Chiou, Department of Accounting, National Taiwan University
               邱軍瑋 / 國立臺灣大學會計學系
               Pei-Cheng Liao, Department of Accounting, National Taiwan University
               廖珮真 / 國立臺灣大學會計學系
               Received 2021/8, Final revision received 2023/6

               Abstract
               This paper first examines the relationship between the appropriateness of D&O insurance
               coverage and audit fees. The results show that if the firm purchases appropriate (normal)
               D&O insurance coverage, as the normal D&O insurance coverage increases, the auditor
               charges lower audit fees. However, if the firm purchases excess (abnormal) D&O insurance
               coverage, it has an adverse effect on the directors’ and managers’ behavior and increases
               the litigation risk. Hence, as the abnormal D&O insurance coverage increases, the auditor
               charges higher audit fees. Further analysis examines the interaction effect between
               the D&O insurance coverage and institutional investors who have insurance business
               relationships with the D&O insured companies on audit fees. The examination reveals that
               when the firm purchases appropriate D&O insurance coverage, the institutional investor
               in the insurance business relationship has an information advantage, which enhances
               the monitoring mechanism. Thus, the auditor charges lower audit fees for the client who
               has an institutional investor in the insurance business relationship. On the other hand,
               when the firm purchases excess D&O insurance coverage, due to conflicts of interest, an
               institutional investor will be afraid of losing current or potential business if they oppose
               management’s decisions. The institutional investor will be less likely to deter the directors’
               and managers’ opportunistic behavior, which increases the firm’s litigation risk. Thus, the
               auditor charges higher audit fees for the client who purchases abnormal D&O insurance
               coverage and has an institutional investor in the insurance business relationship.

              【Keywords】directors’ and officers’ insurance, normal D&O insurance coverage, abnormal
                          D&O insurance coverage, institutional investor in insurance business
                          relationship, audit fees












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