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The Effect of Information Opacity on the Weighting of Performance Measures in the Compensation Contracts
of CEOs: Evidence from U.S. Firms

表 6 股票買賣價差迴歸模型及分析師個數迴歸模型實證結果
應變數：ln(TP)
Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value)
Model A Model B
Constant 4.814 *** 5.059 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.501 *** 1.053 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
RET 0.092 *** 0.021 *
(0.000) (0.076)
SPREAD 0.066
(0.421)
ANALYSTS 0.005 **
(0.026)
ROA × SPREAD 1.858 ***
(0.002)
RET × SPREAD -0.105 *
(0.064)
ROA × ANALYSTS -0.033 ***
(0.002)
RET × ANALYSTS 0.004 ***
(0.003)
LEVERAGE -0.223 *** -0.219 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
SIZE 0.382 *** 0.347 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
MB 0.010 *** 0.010 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
CASHRATIO 0.137 * 0.118
(0.064) (0.140)
CEOTENURE -0.000 -0.000
(0.734) (0.881)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Cluster Yes Yes
Number of observations 28,558 24,014
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.246
F 113.65 93.80
註：* p < 0.1，** p < 0.05，*** p < 0.01。

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