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美國產險業
CEO
更迭與再保險需求
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mean percentage of independent directors on the boards represents 67.5 % of directors. The
mean ROA is 0.023, which is similar to the results of previous studies (e.g., Garven et al.,
2014).
Table 2 presents the Pearson (lower triangle) and Spearman (upper triangle) correlation
coefficients. We find some variables are highly correlated. For example, Table 2 shows the
percentage of independent director of the board is positively and significantly related to
board size (0.486 at the 1 percent level with Pearson and 0.555 at the 1 percent level with
Spearman). In addition, percentage of the independent director on the board is highly
associated with mutual insurers (0.419 at the 1 percent level with Pearson and 0.380 at the 1
percent level with Spearman). We use variance-inflation factors (VIFs) to test for
multicollinearity among all independent variables in the regression design (Neter,
Wasserman, and Kutner, 1985). The VIFs of all independent variables in the regressions are
lower than 2, thus these results support the lack of presence of multicollinearity.
4.2 Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the results of regression of change in reinsurance demand on CEO
turnover. Three regression results are obtained, namely, total demand for reinsurance,
demand for reinsurance from an affiliated reinsurers, and demand for reinsurance from a
non-affiliated reinsurers. We discuss reinsurance demand from affiliated and non-affiliated
reinsurers, because reinsurance ceded to affiliated reinsurers has more retention (lower cost)
than that to non-affiliated reinsurers. In addition, insurers with reinsurance through non-
affiliated reinsurers have lower insolvency risk which is a main concern for CEOs.
27
In Models of ∆Reins_ratio, ∆Reins_aff_ratio and ∆Reins_nonaff_ratio, CEO turnover is
positively related to change in total reinsurance ratio, reinsurance ratio from affiliated
reinsurers and reinsurance ratio from non-affiliated reinsurers, implying that insurers with
CEO turnover tend to increase total reinsurance ratio, affiliated reinsurance ratio and non-
affiliated reinsurance ratio after CEO turnover. One possible reason is that new CEOs want to
be more conservative and may purchase more reinsurance from affiliated and/or non-
affiliated reinsurers as risk transfer to reduce insolvency risk. This result rejects Hypothesis 1.
We find that the organizational form variable is not significant in all Models. It is
implied that stock or mutual insurers are not significantly related to change in reinsurance
27 Cummins et al. (2008) suggest that reinsurance can reduce insolvency risk.