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臺大管理論叢
第
27
卷第
2S
期
261
net income on admitted assets (Ho, 2016).
24
Group
i,t
is an indicator variable: 1 if the firm is a
member of a group and 0 otherwise.
4. Summary Statistics and Empirical Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all variables in the full sample and CEO
turnover samples (routine CEO, non-routine CEO, forced CEO, and voluntary CEO),
respectively. The mean of total reinsurance ratio, affiliated reinsurance ratio, non-affiliated
reinsurance ratio in the full sample are 26.6%
25
, 12.7% and 13.9%, respectively. The average
insurance company purchases reinsurance from non-affiliated reinsurers at a higher rate than
reinsurance from affiliated reinsurers. For CEO turnover sample, mean of affiliated
reinsurance ratio (16.4%) is higher than non-affiliated reinsurance ratio (12.9%). Because we
are ultimately interested in CEO turnover, we report that insurers with routine CEO turnover,
non-routine CEO turnover and forced CEO turnover are more likely to purchase more
reinsurance ratio from affiliated reinsurers (15.8%, 16.8%, and 18.2%) than non-affiliated
reinsurers (13.6%, 12.4%, and 12.4%), respectively. On average, insurers with CEO turnover
tend to increase total reinsurance ratio, affiliated reinsurance ratio and non-affiliated
reinsurance ratio (4.5%, 2.8%, and 1.7%) than full sample (0.9%, 0.4%, and 0.1%). Average
of insurers with non-routine CEO increase reinsurance ratio from affiliated (non-affiliated)
reinsurers 3.4% (0.3%) is higher (less) than the insurers with routine CEO 1.8% (4.1%), and
forced CEO increase reinsurance ratio from affiliated (non-affiliated) reinsurers 3.9% (2.3%)
is higher than the insurers with voluntary CEO 0.2% (0.1%). Mean routine and non-routine
(forced and voluntary) CEO turnover are about 3.4% and 5.9%
26
(6.5% and 2.7%) in the full
sample, respectively. The average CEO turnover rate for the full sample is 9.2%. A total of
161 (180) of 254 CEO turnover are identified as non-routine (forced) CEO turnover. The
average board size is 10 in our sample. The mean of board size is similar to findings in
previous literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond, 2006). Lipton and Lorsch
(1992) indicate that boards of eight or nine members are the most effective. On average, the
24 We also use the ROE (Return on Equity), REBIT (net income after dividends to policyholders, after
capital gains tax and before all other federal and foreign income taxes divided by net admitted assets),
underwriting ROA (net income after dividends to policyholders, after capital gains tax and before all
other federal and foreign income taxes divided by net admitted assets), and operating ROA (net income
before dividends to policyholders, after capital gains tax and before all other federal and foreign income
taxes divided by net admitted assets) (e.g., Adams and Mansi, 2009; He and Sommer, 2011) as the proxy
for firm performance.
25 This result is similar to the findings (0.272) of Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003).
26 The mean of routine and non-routine CEO turnover are 5% and 9%, respectively (He et al., 2011).