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美國產險業
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announcements are significantly positively related to average abnormal stock returns. They
also suggest that turnover announcements are good news for investors, because they expect
turnover to improve corporate performance. However, they find that there are no significant
difference between post-turnovers related performance changes for forced and voluntary
successions. Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2011) find that if forced CEOs suffer more
severe career consequences, then they are less likely to maintain their board position and
other board seats and be sued for earning management misbehavior than voluntary CEOs.
7
They also find that a positive relation between aggressive earnings management and forced
CEO turnover, whereas the relation does not exist between earning management and
voluntary turnover. The evidence implies that new CEOs resulting from forced CEOs
turnover tend to adopt more conservative strategies and purchase more reinsurance to
mitigate risk than voluntary CEOs turnover, because CEOs from forced CEO turnover are
concerned about their job security based on their predecessors’ experience.
Campbell et al. (2011) report that a strong relation between forced CEO turnover and
CEO’s optimism level measures only for good governance companies when boards of
directors act in the interests of shareholders.
8
Hazarika et al. (2011) also find that forced CEO
turnovers are positively related to risk-taking behavior. This finding implies that new CEOs
resulting from forced CEOs turnover may take on high risk projects, and purchase less
reinsurance post CEO turnover than new voluntary CEOs. This leads to the following null
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The reinsurance decision of insurers with forced or voluntary CEO
turnover is not different from that of insurers without CEO turnover
after CEO turnover.
2.4 CEO Turnover, Organizational Structure, and Reinsurance Demand
The literature suggests insurers purchase reinsurance to transfer risk, reduce loss claim
and improve insurer’s capacity when a covered event occurs (e.g., Chen, Doerpinghaus, Lin,
and Yu, 2008). One interesting question is whether organizational form has impact on the
relation between reinsurance and CEO turnover. Previous studies have examined the relation
between organizational structure and reinsurance issues (Mayers and Smith, 1981;
7 Hazarika et al. (2011) use a sample of 1895 turnovers (402 forced turnovers and 1493 voluntary
turnovers) by
Factiva and Lexis-Nexis databases
from 1992 to 2004.
8 Campbell et al. (2011) use a large sample of CEO turnovers from the ExecuComp database over the
period from 1995 to 2005.