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保險經代人能否提供較佳的理賠服務品質？：台灣汽車責任保險實證
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For the product quality hypothesis, some studies have focused on the analysis of cost
efficiency. For instance, Barrese and Nelson (1992) believed that independent agents could
acquire higher commissions because independent agents can handle the agency conflict
between the policyholder and the insurer with better service and in a more efficient manner.
Berger et al. (1997) also refuted the previous finding which stated insurers who adopted
independent agents had a lower-cost efficiency. Instead, they believed that insurers must pay
a higher commission cost to compensate for the results of the better service quality provided
by independent agents.
Another stream of literature highlights the aspects where the insurance intermediary has
superior advantages in light of service quality. For instance, Posey and Yavas (1995) believed
that the independent agent had better insurance expertise and that they could offer insurance
consulting services to their clients. As a result, clients with higher search cost would prefer
an independent agent for their insurance, and those with lower search cost would prefer the
direct writer channel for their insurance. Trigo-Gamarra (2008) found that prior to insurance
purchase, the insurance intermediary could offer better insurance consulting and risk analysis
service.
Other studies also discuss differences between the claim service qualities of the direct
writer and insurance intermediary channels because the insurance intermediary has the rights
of clients. In cases where the insurer is not handling their claim cases well, clients may
switch their business to other insurers. In so doing, insurers are urged to offer better claim
services to clients of insurance intermediaries (Barrese et al., 1995; Kim et al., 1996; Berger
et al., 1997; Venezia et al., 1999). Venezia et al. (1999) believed that if independent agents
could offer better claim service quality, then information asymmetry may exist between the
insurer and policyholder.
24
In separating equilibrium, high-risk clients would prefer
independent agents for their advantageous claim service. By contrast, low-risk clients would
choose the direct writer channel. Hsieh et al. (2014) verified the prediction of Venezia et al.
(1999) and supported the existence of information asymmetry hypothesis in the auto
insurance market of Taiwan. In prior literature, some empirical studies support the product
quality hypothesis
25
, whereas others do not.
26
24 Venezia et al. (1999) believed that information asymmetry existed in channel choice and accident risk
between insurer and policyholder.
25 Barrese and Nelson (1992); Barrese et al. (1995); Kim et al. (1996); Berger et al. (1997); Posey and Yavas
(1995); Posey and Tennyson (1998); Trigo-Gamarra (2008)
26 Joskow (1973); Etgar (1976); Cummins and VanDerhei (1979); Klumpes (2004)