Page 227 - 33-2
P. 227

NTU Management Review Vol. 33 No. 2 Aug. 2023




               SPREAD) is a dependent variable representing the difference between government-
               controlled banks' loans and risk-free interest rates.
                      spread after presidential elections
               1.  The effect of corporate political donations on government-controlled bank loan rate

                      spread after presidential elections
                  spread after presidential elections

                                                                 =     +              +                  +                       +                      
                                    �����  �    �   ���   �   ���   �     ���    �     ���
                                       =     +              +                  +                       +                      
                                                          +     � �              +                      +                  +                     ���
                                                               
                                                                    ����
                                                    ��� �
                                                          ����
                                                              ��� �
                                                                          ��� �
                                    �����
                                                �
                                               ���
                                                                                 � ���
                                                          +                       � +                          +              +     ���  ���
                                                          +                  +                      +                  +                               
                                               ��� ���
                                          � �
                                                                � ���
                                                       ��
                                                          ���
                                                                     ��� ��
                                                                           � ���
                                                                                ��
                                                          +                      +                          +              +                 
                                                          +                 
                                                  ��� +                     
                                                                ��� +                                             
                                                                           ���
                                                                                ��
                                          � ��
                                                                      �� ��
                                                       �� ��
                                                                                      �����
                                                               �����
                                                 �����
                                                                                      ���
                                          ��                        +                           
                                                          +                  ����� ���  �� ��  �����  +                                              �����
                                                    +                     
                                                          +    
                                                                      ��
                                          ��
                                                                    ���
                                                          +                            +                           
                                          ��
                                                                    ���
                                                          + �                              �             �                                                          +      .
                                                    ���
                                                          ��
                                                                                     ���
                                                          + �                              �             �                                                          +      .   (3)
                                                                                     ���
                  2.  The
                              effect  of  firms'  donations  to  the  winner  of  the  presidential  election  on  the
               2.  The effect of firms’ donations to the winner of the presidential election on the
                  2.  The  effect  of  firms'  donations  to  the  winner  of  the  presidential  election  on  the
                      government-controlled bank loans rate spread after presidential elections
                  government-controlled bank loans rate spread after presidential elections

                      government-controlled bank loans rate spread after presidential elections

                                                                �����  =     +                          +                  +                     
                                           �
                                                              �
                                                                         �
                                                �
                                                         ���
                                                                               ���
                                                                   ���
                                                                �����  =     +                          +                  +                     
                                                          +    
                                           �                  +                  +                      +                 
                                                                   ���
                                                         ��� ���
                                                                         �
                                                                               ��� ���
                                                � ���
                                                      �
                                                                            �
                                          �
                                                              � �
                                                                       ���
                                                          +                 
                                                 ��� +                      +                          +    
                                                          +                      +                  +                      +                            
                                                      �
                                                                       ���
                                                                            �
                                                                                 ���
                                                                           ���
                                                           ������
                                                      �
                                                ���
                                          � �
                                                                                 ��
                                                                 � ��
                                                                                      ���
                                                                           ���
                                                          +                  ��� +                  �����  �� ��  �����  ��  ���
                                                          +                 
                                                             ��� +                     
                                                  +                      +                          +             
                                                      � ��
                                                ���
                                          � ��

                                                          +                  +                  +                            +                           
                                                               +                     
                                         +                                             
                                                                   ��
                                                            �����
                                                     ��
                                                ���
                                                                          �����
                                                          �����
                                                                 ��
                                          �� ��
                                                                                 ��
                                                                           ���
                                                                                           ���
                                         +                                              �����  +                            +                           
                                                                                           ���
                                                                           ���
                                                                 ��
                                                                                 ��
                                                          + �                              �             �                                                          +      .   (4)
                                           ��
                                                                                     ���
                                                          + �                              �             �                                                          +      .
                                                3. Findings                          ���

                                                  3. Findings
                                                  3. Findings
                   As mentioned earlier, this study utilizes Heckman (1979) two-stage model for

               its analysis. In the first stage, we control the determinants affecting corporate political
                        As mentioned earlier, this study utilizes Heckman (1979) two-stage model for its
               donations and the choice between long-term and short-term loan contracts. In the second
                  analysis. In the first stage, we control the determinants affecting corporate political
                       As mentioned earlier, this study utilizes Heckman (1979) two-stage model for its
               stage, the empirical results reveal that firms that make political donations or donate to the
                  donations  and  the  choice  between  long-term  and  short-term  loan  contracts.  In  the
                  analysis. In the first stage, we control the determinants affecting corporate political
               presidential candidate winner get lower bank loan interest rates from the government-
                  second stage, the empirical results reveal that firms that make political donations or
                  donations  and  the  choice  between  long-term  and  short-term  loan  contracts.  In  the
               controlled bank after the elections. Furthermore, this study discovers that firms engaged
                  second stage, the empirical results reveal that firms that make political donations or
                  donate to the presidential candidate winner get lower bank loan interest rates from the
               in political donations obtain lower bank loan interest rates on medium-term or long-term
                  donate to the presidential candidate winner get lower bank loan interest rates from the
                  government-controlled bank after the elections. Furthermore, this study discovers that
               government-controlled bank loan contracts.
                  government-controlled bank after the elections. Furthermore, this study discovers that
                  firms engaged in political donations obtain lower bank loan interest rates on medium-
                  firms engaged in political donations obtain lower bank loan interest rates on medium-
                  term or long-term government-controlled bank loan contracts.

                  term or long-term government-controlled bank loan contracts.
                                                     219
                                                4. Limitations
                                                4. Limitations

                  (1)    This study only focuses on corporate political donations during the presidential
                  elections because after the implementation of Personal Data Protection Act, information
                  (1) This study only focuses on corporate political donations during the presidential
                  elections because after the implementation of Personal Data Protection Act, information
                                                         48

                                                         48
   222   223   224   225   226   227   228   229   230   231   232