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顧客與供應商關係與成本結構

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informative for firms with sticky cost structure. Weiss’s findings suggest that firms’ cost

behaviors affect analyst forecast accuracy and coverage and thus capital market.

2.2 Literature Review on Customer Concentration

Ou, Lee, Cho, and Lin (2016) document that customers’ order size, order amount,

and new product purchase rate are positively and significantly associated with customer

profit contribution. Jen and Chen (2007) also suggest that suppliers have to also evaluate

individual customer value rather than just the average of the total customers, suggesting

that customer-supplier relationship is a key driver of the supplier’s profits. One important

concept that capture customer-supplier relationship is customer concentration which is

defined as the relative size of customers that adds to a firm's revenue. A firm exhibits high

level of customer-based concentration when its revenue is largely contributed by its major

customer.

From the view of customer-supplier relationship, two types of interdependence affect

the relationship: (1) dependence asymmetry and (2) mutual dependence (Gulati and Sytch,

2007). The conventional view on customer concentration focuses on dependence

asymmetry. Galbraith (1952) provides a tactic for customer to exercise their power to their

suppliers by keeping the suppliers in uncertainty. Suppliers often invest resources to meet

major customer's demand, while major customers can switch their order to other suppliers.

Thus, suppliers are usually more dependent on major customers. Using Taiwan OEM

suppliers as an example, Kang and Seetoo (2007) demonstrate that suppliers even have to

use risky unilateral relation-specific investments as a hostage to obtain customers’ orders

and long-term cooperation. In contrast, mutual dependence suggests that customer and

supplier are dependent on each other. The dependence is especially higher when suppliers

sell highly specialized products. For example, inter-organizational systems between

customers and supplies are usually build to facilitate information sharing and sustain

mutual dependence (Chang, 2010). The commonly-adopted corporation mechanisms such

as Continuous Replenishment Planning (CRP) and Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) can

result in lower cost and lower order variability for suppliers than that without coordination

mechanism (Guo, Chiang, Liu, and Liou, 2002). Mutual dependence makes the cost of

changing supplier/customer more expensive for both parties. Cool and Henderson (1998),

using French manufacturing data, show that buyer power explains a much larger

percentage of the variance in the seller’s profitability than supplier (seller) power. They

argue that the power in supply chain may come from the relative degree of concentration