250 /302
顧客與供應商關係與成本結構
250
demand shocks.
4
Using employment protection legislation (EPL) provisions in 19 OECD
countries as a proxy for larger labor adjustment costs, Banker et al. (2013) find that firms
in these countries exhibit greater cost stickiness.
Anderson et al. (2003) document that cost stickiness declines with the aggregation of
periods since managers better assess the permanence of a change in demand and the
adjustment costs become smaller than the cost of retaining unutilized resources. Chen et
al. (2012) document that a lower degree of SG&A cost stickiness in firms experiencing
negative demand shocks in two consecutive years as managers are more likely to consider
fall in demand to be permanent when sales decrease in two consecutive years and
downsize the capacity accordingly.
In addition, Balakrishnan, Petersen, and Soderstrom (2004) extend Anderson et al.
(2003) and find that capacity utilization may affect the manager's response to a change in
activity levels. They argue that manager’s response to a decrease in activity levels is
smaller (larger) than that for an increase only when capacity is currently strained (in
excess).
2.1.1.2 Agency Explanations
Some studies attribute cost stickiness behaviors in part to agency problem. For
example, based on the empire building and the downsizing literature, Chen et al. (2012)
argue that managers’ incentives to grow a firm beyond its optimal size or to maintain
unutilized resources for their personal benefit induce cost stickiness. Using corporate free
cash flow, chief executive officer (CEO) horizon, tenure, and compensation structure as
proxies for agency problems. They find that the degree of cost stickiness is positively
associated with agency problem, and the effective corporate governance can mitigate such
positive association.
On the other hand, Kama and Weiss (2013) find that managers are more likely to cut
down on slack resources for sales decreases when they have incentives to avoid losses or
earning decreases, or to meet analyst earnings forecasts. Such managerial incentives
significantly moderate the degree of cost stickiness. Likewise, using a sample of private
Belgium firms, Dierynck et al. (2012) find that firms that just meet or beat the zero
earnings benchmark exhibit less labor cost asymmetry when facing sales decreases in
relative to other firms.
4 Balakrishnan et al. (2014) suggest that in Anderson’s model, changes in cost should be scaled by sales
rather than total costs in order to control for the effects of fixed costs.