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投資機會和投資者保護機制對控股股東派息的影響
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ratios are positively and significantly associated with legal investor protection and control
divergence, which is consistent with previous studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Faccio et al.,
2001). However, the interactions among the legal protection of investors, control
divergence, and investment opportunities are negatively and significantly associated with
dividend payout ratios. This suggests that the dividends that are paid out by controlling
shareholders with a large control divergence are lower in countries in which the legal
protection of investors is strong, especially if the reinvestment opportunities are good.
These control divergent firms with good growth opportunities do not see the need to
consistently pay out a large fraction of their earnings to reduce agency costs or to signal to
minority investors their reluctance to expropriate (Miller and Rock, 1985; Yoon and
Starks, 1995). Our results are robust after a battery of sensitivity tests with four alternative
dividends payout ratios both before and after adjustments for industry effects. Our
findings suggest that a country’s legal institutions play an important governance role in the
determination of the dividend policies of ultimate owners with a large control divergence,
which implies that shareholder power and the “divergence” force cancel each other out.
Good legal protection protects the economic benefit of higher future reinvestment rates for
investors in highly concentrated firms by reducing current dividend payouts when the
investment opportunities are good.
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and dividend policies
in several ways. Previous cross-country studies focus on the effects of ultimate ownership
structure on dividend policies without considering the interaction effect of legal
institutions (Faccio et al., 2001), or concentrate on the effects of investor protection
without considering ownership structure (La Porta et al., 2000). Our study extends the
work of La Porta et al. (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001) by examining the simultaneous
effects on dividend policies of the control divergence of controlling shareholders and the
level of investor protection, after controlling for the growth opportunities of firms. This
joint effect is important, as it reflects how controlling shareholders alter their dividend
decisions when good legal investor protection limits their ability to expropriate, which
reduces the alertness of outside investors to expropriation.
In addition, the non-U.S. setting of our study allows us to focus on countries in which
concentrated ownership, family-controlled, pyramidal, and cross-holding ownership
structures are typical. The findings of the study shed light on the extent of influence of the
monitoring role of legal institutions on the dividend policies of ultimate owners, and
provide insight for regulators on the enhancement of the corporate governance system.