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181

臺大管理論叢

28

卷第

1

hypothesis is stated as follows.

Hypothesis: The positive relationship between dividends and the control divergence

of controlling shareholders is less pronounced in countries in which legal

investor protection is strong and the investment opportunities of firms

are good.

We employ three measures of legal investor protection and the governance of

controlling shareholder activities in accordance with the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-

Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and La Porta et al. (2000): law origin, the anti-

director rights index, and the rating of disclosure standards. Each variable measures a

specific aspect of legal protection. Law origin (

Legal

) measures the traditional quality of

legal protection, the anti-director rights index (

Right

) measures the existence of investor

protection rules, and the rating of disclosure standards (

Disclosure

) measures the existence

and quality of the information that is available to outside investors.

3. Sample and Variables

3.1 Sample

The sample in this study comprises firms from nine East Asian economies and

thirteen European countries based on the 2000 edition of the WorldScope database. In the

original database there are 77,893 firm-years from these twenty-two countries in the

period 1987 to 2000. However, there is ownership data for only 51,876 firm-years.

3

The

sample selection process is described in Panel A of Appendix A. We exclude financial

firms (those with a primary SIC code of between 6000-6999); firms with missing dividend

data (which is needed to compute the 3-year average dividend); firms with missing,

negative, or zero operating cash flow, sales, market value, or net income data (to compute

dividend payout ratios); firms with missing data that are needed for the construction of the

control variables that are used in the regression; and firms with dividends that are greater

than sales. To reduce outliers, we also exclude firms with industry-adjusted average

dividend payout ratios that are in the top and bottom 1%. Our final sample contains 6,093

3 The data for the ownership variables are obtained from the databases of Claessens et al. (2000) for

East Asia and Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western Europe, which refer to 1996 for East Asia and

France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and the U.K. We do not extend the sample period beyond 2000 to

avoid the measure error due to the possible changes in ownership after 2000.