384 / 414
審計委員會權益薪酬之決定因素
384
5.2 Multivariate Test
We use logit regression to investigate what factors are associated with equity-based
compensation for audit committee members, including stock and options. The results are
presented in Table 6. We find that
FREE_TOBIN
, a proxy for agency conflict, is significantly
and negatively associated with stock and option compensation for audit committee members
(Coefficient = -0.001, Z-statistics = -3.26). This finding confirms the first hypothesis,
suggesting that if the agency conflict in firms is severe, which implies that audit committee
members have more opportunities and stronger incentives to benefit themselves, firms are
inclined to not provide audit committee members with equity-based compensation. However,
if agency conflicts in the firm are mild, implying fewer incentives and opportunities for the
audit committee members to benefit themselves, the firm will have fewer concerns about
providing equity-based compensation to its audit committee members.
In addition, consistent with hypothesis H2, the coefficient on
OVERLAP_AUCOMP
is
positive and significant (Coefficient = 1.956, Z-statistics = 6.00), suggesting that a higher
proportion of compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee is
associated with a higher probability of using stock and options as remuneration for audit
committee members. This result suggests that when more audit committee members are also
compensation committee members, they have more power to determine their compensation,
and because the possible benefit from equity-based compensation is greater than that from a
fixed salary, compensation committee members are more likely to provide equity-based
compensation to audit committee members.
Finally, as discussed in section 3.3, audit committee members who are top executives of
other firms and receive executive compensation from their home company prefer a cash
retainer over stocks and options so that they can diversify their personal portfolio and lower
their compensation contingency. This conjecture is also supported by the data. The results
show that the proportion of audit committee members who are also top executives in other
firms (
OTHER_EXE
) is significant and negatively associated with the probability of
providing equity-based compensation to audit committee members (Coefficient = -0.405,
Z-statistics = -2.68).