An Empirical Analysis of Managerial Compensation: Agency and Tournament Perspectives

Chen, M. Y., and Shih, Y. H. 2004. An Empirical Analysis of Managerial Compensation: Agency and Tournament Perspectives. NTU Management Review, 15 (1): 131-166

Ming-Yuan Chen, Assistant Professor, Department and Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics, Tamkang University
Ya-Hui Shih, Graduate Student, Department and Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics, Tamkang University

Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence about the determinants of the level of managerial compensation and of the structure of compensation within the management hierarchy. We establish the hypotheses relating the level of managerial pay and pay differentials between organizational levels to individual and firm characteristics suggested by the agency model and the tournament theory. Management hierarchy is defined in terms of position titles and the amount of compensation. The determinants emphasized here include the managerial position in the management hierarchy, ownership concentration of the firm, business risks, firm size, profitability, firm age and so on. Hypotheses are tested cross-sectionally using the data of 737 managers in 171 Taiwan's listed companies. Empirical results show that most of the predictions emerged in the theories of agency and tournaments gain support in the data, particularly when the management hierarchy is defined as the amount of compensation.
 


Keywords

Managerial compensation Agency theory Tournament theory Management hierarchy


NTU Management Review No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei, 10617 Taiwan
3F, Bldg. 1, College of Management, National Taiwan University

TEL: +886-2-33661026  +886-2-33665404  

E-mail: ntupmcenter@ntu.edu.tw

Subsidized by Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Science, National Science and Technology Council, Executive Yuan.

Subscription