Chen, J. Y., and Sheu, J. B. 2017. Green Policy-Driven Closed-Loop Supply Chain for Recycling of Economically-Disadvantaged Recycled Materials. NTU Management Review, 27 (2): 163-184. doi:10.6226/NTUMR.2017.JAN.A103-006   
以綠色導向政策探討低經濟價值再生材料之回收供應鏈  
Green Policy-Driven Closed-Loop Supply Chain for Recycling of Economically-Disadvantaged Recycled Materials
陳彥銘 / 國立高雄第一科技大學運籌管理系教授
Yenming J. Chen, Professor, Department of Logistics Management, National Kaohsiung First University of Science and Technology

許鉅秉 / 國立臺灣大學工商管理學系特聘教授
Jiuh-Biing Sheu, Distinguished Professor, Department of Business Administration, National Taiwan University

中文摘要
本文探討對於低經濟價值再生材料(EDRMS) 在低利潤資源回收上,如何制定相關有效的環境政策。經過深入分析,我們提出一個政策工具,其立論是基於順序競爭賽局的多層次閉環供應鏈模型,體現互相競爭的製造商、原生和再生材料供應商以及政府之間的相互作用。分析結果表明,目前的稅收補貼制度是有效的,因為這一政策提高了參與回收系統各方公司的利潤。我們建議政府應該多關注低利潤資源回收的政策制度。
中文關鍵字綠色供應鏈管理, 賽局理論, 稅收補貼制度, 低利潤資源回收, 低經濟價值再生材料(EDRM)

英文摘要
This paper investigates an effectiveness problem in the enactment of environmental policies aimed at profitless recycling of economically disadvantaged recycled materials (EDRMs). After thorough analysis, a policy instrument has been proposed. The arguments are established from a closed-loop supply chain model in a multiplayer hierarchical Stackelberg game, manifesting interactions between competing manufacturers, suppliers of virgin and recycled materials, and the government. Analytical results indicate that a tax-subsidy system is effective because this policy improves the profits of all parties involved in the recycling system. We suggest that governments should involve in the recycling practice of profitless materials.
英文關鍵字green supply chain management, game theory, tax-subsidy system, profitless recycling, economically-disadvantaged recycled materials (EDRM)