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NTU Management Review Vol. 34 No. 1 Apr. 2024




                             reserves are neither under- nor over- reserved compared to P-C nonpublic
                             insurers using external actuaries.


                   Further, publicly-traded firms should receive more scrutiny by capital markets than

               nonpublic insurers. Therefore, publicly-traded insurers using in-house actuaries may report
               more accurate reserves than nonpublicly-traded insurers using in-house actuaries because
               of the extra scrutiny afforded by the stock market. Thus, we expect that the effect of using

               in-house actuaries would be largely negated for publicly-traded firms. If this is the case,
               then weak publicly-traded P-C insurers using in-house actuaries should exhibit less under-
               reserving than nonpublic insurers using in-house actuaries:
               Hypothesis 2: Weak publicly-traded P-C insurers using an in-house actuary are less under-
                            reserved than weak nonpublic P-C insurers using an in-house actuary pre-

                            SOX.


                   Third, the implementation of SOX may have had a bearing on loss reserving

               practices with regard to the usage of in-house actuaries to certify loss reserves. SOX
               applies only to publicly-traded firms. After SOX, managers are expected to have reduced
               any opportunistic behavior regarding financial reporting due to increasing legal liability
               and enhanced regulatory requirements. Increasing legal liability after SOX is expected to
               make the board of directors more vigilant in monitoring managers with respect to financial

               reporting as well. And research mostly supports this view; He, Miller, and Yang (2012)
               find that both public and large privately-held insurers increased board independence after
               SOX.
                    17
                   We hypothesize that weak, publicly-traded insurers will be under-reserved before
               SOX; thus, they will have more “to make up” in loss reserves after SOX. Nonetheless,




                 17  Akhigbe and Martin (2006) argue that SOX’s disclosure requirements could increase transparency
                    in the financial services industry including insurance. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond
                    (2009) suggest that firms with internal control deficiencies reduced their information risk due to the
                    mandatory SOX disclosure requirements. This leads to a lower cost of capital. Iliev (2010) suggests
                    that SOX compliance leads to conservative reported earnings. Eckles et al. (2011) find limited
                    evidence that SOX reduces managerial opportunism to manage loss reserves to maximize personal
                    compensation. However, Ma and Pope (2020) use a difference-in-difference approach and find that
                    SOX did not have an impact on the accuracy of loss reserves for publicly-traded insurers.


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