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以綠色導向政策探討低經濟價值再生材料之回收供應鏈
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From Proposition 1, we know that the tax rate is always positive and the subsidy rate is
positive because
c
y
>
c
x
. Given that all the decisions are in equilibrium, increase of EDRM
mixture or reduction of the product effluents will effectively increase the total quantity
consumption (9) and encourage the recycling of EDRMs. Although the manufacturers have
been charged tax, they earn more profit than the system without tax-subsidy. The long-term
financial balance of the tax and subsidy will be maintained in the future adjustment of
product design and material mixture. Currently, many governments collect money from
producers in a form of Advance Disposal Fee (Walls and Palmer, 2001). The money they
collected must be saved for a fund because a large portion of the fund will go to process
colossal amount of historical waste. Beside the maintenance of the fund, more importantly,
we demonstrate in the next analysis that government intervention can effectively encourage
manufacturers to use more EDRMs.
Proposition 2
. ((2S)
Performances
). Let
y
= (
εσ
–
ϕξ
– (
c
y
–
c
x
)
σ
+ (
c
m
–
c
x
1)). The social
welfare is
(11)
the two suppliers jointly make profit is
(12)
and the optimal profits for all manufacturers are
(13)
Given the synthetic quantity,
y
, profits of all parties and social welfare are easily
presented in Proposition 2. With the clear understanding in the consequence of tax-subsidy,
we are able to compare the improvement of tax-subsidy.
Proposition 3
. (
tax-subsidy improvement
). The tax-subsidy policy framework does
improve the total social welfare as well as the profits of both material suppliers and
manufacturers, that is,
(14)
(15)
(16)