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臺大管理論叢

26

卷第

3

157

participants. Pan et al. (2003) suggest that an increase in price volatility induces both hedgers

and speculators to engage in more futures trading. In particular, when spot price volatility

goes up, trading demand for hedgers, not for speculators, will increase significantly. Chang

et al. (2000) assert that increasing spot volatility tends to increase the demand for hedging

more than the demand for speculation. If open interest indeed reflects hedging demand, it

would rise and fall with the spot volatility, which stimulate hedging transactions. This leads

our testable implication (3) as follows:

Testable implication (3):

Open interest is positively associated with spot volatility.

Chang et al. (2000) further suggest that if volatility shock arises during the day, hedgers

will adjust upward their expected volatility for the next term. Given the expected volatility at

the beginning of the day, the unexpected volatility shock will drive further portfolio

adjustment and additional hedging demand. This implies that the increase in unexpected

volatility should correspond to higher level of open interest, reflecting the increase in

hedging demand. Our testable implication (4) thus is constructed as follows:

Testable implication (4):

Open interest rises with increased unexpected spot volatility.

2.3 Divergences in Traders’ Opinions

Hypothesis 3: Open interest represents the cross-sectional divergence in opinions

regarding the future value of the underlying asset.

Previous literature has long viewed volume as the outcome of differences in traders’

opinions. Volume increase significantly when investors hold diverged expectations (Varian,

1985) or interpret the available information differently (Harris and Raviv, 1993; Shalen,

1993). Bessembinder et al. (1996) emphasize that open interest also varies with the

divergence of traders’ opinions. They argue that the difference of opinion about the future

price could induce trading, particular the open-position transactions that increases open

interest. When traders are divergence in their opinions, those who anticipate the price to rise

rush to open-buy transactions (open new positions to long) while those who anticipate the

price to fall engage in open-sell transactions (open new positions to short). Together their

transactions increase open interest and volume simultaneously. As a result, whenever the

increment in open interest is accompanied by greater volume, the change in open interest is

likely due to the divergences of opinion.

On the other hand, when traders are less divergence in their views about future

equilibrium price, the current price will quickly move toward the equilibrium without