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企業之不對稱資訊、銀行往來關係及直接與間接融資

142

L

it

*

, indirect financing level D

it

*

= B

it

*

+ S

it

*

(B

it

*

denotes bonds and S

it

*

denotes stocks),

banking relationship H

it

*

, and production level N

it

*

and K

it

*

, implicit differentiation, partial

total derivative, and comparative statistics analysis are employed in this theoretical analysis.

3. Findings

The micro-foundation theoretical framework delineates that a higher level of

enterprises’ creditworthiness θ

it

(i.e., the improvement of information asymmetry) may result

in a less intensive banking relationship. In other words, an enterprise with a higher (lower)

extent of information asymmetry may have a more intensive (less intensive) banking

relationship. An enterprise with a significant (insignificant) asymmetric information problem

is more inclined to select indirect (direct) financing arrangements when its creditworthiness

or information asymmetry is improved. Besides, economic expansion (depression) could

contribute to a more intensive (less intensive) banking relationship due to lower (higher)

financing costs from banks or indirect financing, compared to direct financing. An enterprise

with a lower (higher) extent of information asymmetry is more inclined to have a higher

(lower) level of indirect financing during economic expansion. Although direct and indirect

financing are substitutes during a given economic state, they are complements in a complete

business cycle.

4. Research Limitations/Implications

Given the complexity of the existing micro-foundation theoretical framework developed

in this study, loan contract terms could only incorporate interest rate and loan amount. Loan

duration and collateral requirements could not be incorporated in the theoretical model. In

addition, for simplicity but without loss of generality, the asymmetric information problem

did not distinguish adverse selection and moral hazard problem for detailed analysis. In the

absence of these variables, some implications regarding loan contract terms and information

asymmetry need to be applied with caution. Further studies could extend to analyze more

loan terms and information asymmetry variables in theoretical analysis.

5. Originality/Contribution

Most current papers associated with direct and indirect financing focus only on existing

macro-trends and empirical analysis, whereas this study addresses the importance of

information asymmetry and banking relationship from the micro-behavior foundation and