245 /342
245
臺大管理論叢
2017/5
第
27
卷第
2S
期
245-288
DOI:10.6226/NTUMR.2017.DEC.RM104-009
美國產險業 CEO 更迭與再保險需求
CEO Turnover and Reinsurance Demand in the U.S. Property
Casualty Insurance Industry
摘 要
本文探討美國產險業
CEO
更迭對再保險需求的影響。實證結果顯示，有
CEO
更迭的
保險公司在
CEO
更迭後更有可能增加再保險的需求。本文進一步分析，在
CEO
更迭後，
非例行性（強迫性）
CEO
更迭較沒有更迭的保險公司更有可能增加再保險的需求，但
例行性（任意性）
CEO
更迭較沒有更迭的保險公司則不太會改變對再保險的需求。一
個可能的解釋是，來自非例行性（強迫性）更迭的新任
CEO
的保險公司更有可能增加
再保險需求是為穩定盈餘與減少風險以確保新任
CEO
的工作安全性。此外，在
CEO
更迭後，相互保險的組織型態與
CEO
更迭的交乘項與再保險需求為負相關。研究結果
顯示，在
2002
年沙賓法案通過後，保險公司
CEO
更迭與再保險需求無關。本研究結
果指出
CEO
更迭顯著影響再保險需求。
【關鍵字】
再保險需求、
CEO
更迭、非例行性
CEO
更迭、強迫性
CEO
更迭、
SOX
法案
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of CEO turnover on reinsurance demand in the U.S.
property casualty insurance industry. Our evidence shows that insurers with CEO turnover
are more likely to increase reinsurance demand after CEO turnover. More detailed analyses
indicates that insurers with non-routine (forced) CEO turnover are more likely to increase
reinsurance than insurers without CEO turnover, but insurers with routine (voluntary) CEO
turnover are not likely to change reinsurance policies after CEO turnover. One possible
explanation for these results is that an insurer with a new CEO resulting from non-routine
(forced) CEO turnover is more likely to increase demand for reinsurance to stabilize earnings
and reduce risk to protect the job security of the new CEO. The evidence shows that the
interaction effect between mutual form and CEO turnover is negatively related to reinsurance
demand after CEO turnover. Finally, our results also show that insurers with CEO turnover
are not related to reinsurance demand after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. The overall
results of this study indicate that CEO turnovers have a significant impact on the demand for
reinsurance.
【
Keywords
】
reinsurance demand, CEO turnover, non-routine CEO turnover, forced CEO
turnover, SOX Act
何佳玲
/
淡江大學保險學系助理教授
Chia-Ling Ho
/ Assistant Professor, Department of Insurance, Tamkang University
Received 2015/10, Final revision received 2016/12