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3.3  The No-MCN Structure (N)
                      Note that while the leagued-MCN structure may serve as a benchmark of the
                independent-MCN structure for us to assess the impact of the MCN company, there is
                another  possibility  to  do  the  assessment:  completely  removing  the  MCN  company.
                                                          NTU Management Review Vol. 33 No. 2 Aug. 2023
                Therefore, to better figure out the benefit brought by the MCN company, if any, we

                consider the third industry structure, the no-MCN structure, which is in between the

                previous  two  structures.  Under  this  structure,  all  the  settings  are  similar  to  the

                independent-MCN structure except for the nonexistence of the MCN company. The

                industry structure of no-MCN is depicted in Figure 4.




                                    Figure 3 The Leagued-MCN Structure











                                        Figure 4. The no-MCN structure
                                       Figure 4 The No-MCN Structure


               previous two structures. Under this structure, all the settings are similar to the independent-
                     Due to the disappearance of the intermediary, business owners who need creators
               MCN structure except for the nonexistence of the MCN company. The industry structure
                to create advertorials must make the advertorial allocation problem by themselves. We
               of no-MCN is depicted in Figure 4.
                   Due to the disappearance of the intermediary, business owners who need creators
                consider one business owner (it) in this model, and it still needs an advertorial to meet
               to create advertorials must make the advertorial allocation problem by themselves. We
                a  certain  performance  threshold  to  achieve  the  advertising  effect.  As  a  result,  the
               consider one business owner (it) in this model, and it still needs an advertorial to meet a
               certain performance threshold to achieve the advertising effect. As a result, the business
                business  owner’s  advertorial  allocation  problem  is  to  maximize  the  probability  of
               owner’s advertorial allocation problem is to maximize the probability of reaching the
                    Note  that  the  decision  variable         affects
                reaching the performance threshold, i.e., to solve         and       ,  which  are  determined
                                                                            
                                                                   
               performance threshold, i.e., to solve           �        �
                    independently by the two creators to maximize their own expected profits
                                                                � � � � .
                                          
                                                        
                                                               
                                                                      
                                                                           
                 Note  that  the  decision  variable         affects         and       ,  which  are  determined
                                         = max
                                                          +          −                        
                                                         � �     
                                          
                                                 � �
                                               
                                                                     �
                                                             �

                                                                     N
                                                                         �
                                                                    e
                   Note that the decision variable x affects    and    , which are determined
                                                              N
                                                                             �
                                        �
                                                             e                             
                                           = max  (             )         
                 independently by the two creators to maximize their own expected profits
                                                                     L
                                                       �
                                        �
                                                              H � �
                                                          �
                                                                            �
                                                                         �
                                             � �
               independently by the two creators to maximize their own expected profits
                                                      15
                    and                                                �
                                         = max  (             )                                       �  �
                                     �
                                     �
                                                    �
                                                              � �
                                                        �
                   and                    � �                          �
                                         = max  (             )                      (1        )             .
                                                                           �
                                                                               �
                                     �
                 and                 �     � �      �  �     � �           �  �
               3.4 Assumption         = max  (             )                      (1        )             .
                                                                         �
                                                                            �
                                   �
                    3.4  Assumption
                                                  �
                                                                           �
                                                           � �
                                   �
                                                     �
                                                                         �
                   To avoid tedious derivations that do not generate managerial insights, we make some
                                        � �
                                                     11
                        To avoid tedious derivations that do not generate managerial insights, we make
                 3.4  Assumption
                    some technical assumptions throughout this study in Assumption 1. These assumptions
                      To avoid tedious derivations that do not generate managerial insights, we make
                    are used for all three MCN-creator structures.
                 some technical assumptions throughout this study in Assumption 1. These assumptions
                                                                             �
                                                  ����    ���      � � ���  � �(���)
                    Assumption  1.  Let  q =                                  �        and  q =
                                                                                             �
                                           �
                                               �� � (����)
                 are used for all three MCN-creator structures.   �  �(��(���)�)  ��
                                                 �
                                                        .
                        ����      ���   � � ���  � �(���) ��� We  assume  that  β β A < 2k ,  q ≥0 ,
                                                                           �
                                                 �
                                                 ����           � � ���   � �(���)        �
                                                                           � � �
                                        �(����)
                 Assumption  1.  Let  q =          ��                               and  q =
                                   �
                    �� � (��(���)�)
                                                                                           �
                                         �
                                             �� � (����)  �   �(��(���)�)    ��
                                 �        �    �  � �      �       �    �  � �     �         �
                                               �β A ,  4kβ q ≤ 4k    β β A ,  4k q ≤ (4k   
                    q ≥0 ,  4kβ q ≤ 4k    β   � �(���)     � �          � �           �
                     �
                               ��� �
                                 �
                                               � �
                     ����
                                      � � ���
                                                �     .  We  assume  that  β β A < 2k ,  q ≥0 ,
                 �� � (��(���)�)  �  �(����)     ��                       � �          �
                    β β A )(γ    xA), and  4k q ≤ (4k    β β A )(γ    (1    x)A).
                        � �
                                                     �
                                                          �
                                                             � �
                     �
                                            �
                                              �
                     � �
                                                          � �
                              �        �    �  � �      �        �    �  � �     �         �
                 q ≥0 ,  4kβ q ≤ 4k    β β A ,  4kβ q ≤ 4k    β β A ,  4k q ≤ (4k   
                                            � �
                                                        � �
                                                                      � �
                              � �
                   �
                                                                                   �

                 β β A )(γ    xA), and  4k q ≤ (4k    β β A )(γ    (1    x)A).
                     � �
                                                   �
                                                          � �
                                                        �
                                         �
                   �
                                            �
                   � �
                                                        � �
                        These technical assumptions may be categorized into three groups according to

                    their  major  implications.  In  particular,                 < 2    ,       ≥0,  and       ≥0  are  to
                                                                                    �
                                                          � �
                                                                        �
                      These technical assumptions may be categorized into three groups according to
                                                              �        �    �  � �         �
                    make the MCN’s profit function concave,  4              ≤ 4                         and  4              ≤
                                                             � �
                                                                                           � �
                                                                           � �
                 their  major  implications.  In  particular,                 < 2    ,       ≥0,  and       ≥0  are  to
                                                                                  �
                                                        � �
                                                                     �
                    4                         are to make the probabilities for the creators to meet the target           
                              � �
                      �
                           �
                           � �
                                                                                             � �
                                                                         �
                                                                                        �
                                                                    �
                                                           �
                                                                            � �
                 make the MCN’s profit function concave,  4              ≤ 4                         and  4              ≤
                                                           � �
                                                                                        � �
                                                                         � �
                    and              no greater than 1 in equilibrium, and the last two conditions are to make the
                         � �
                 4                         are to make the probabilities for the creators to meet the target           
                         �
                           � �
                    �
                         � �
                                                                                          � �
                    revenue sharing ratios         and         no greater than 1 in equilibrium.
                                                  �
                                          �
                 and              no greater than 1 in equilibrium, and the last two conditions are to make the
                       � �

                 revenue sharing ratios         and         no greater than 1 in equilibrium.
                                                �
                                        �
                                                         16

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