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5. Discussion
In the context of Asian family firms, corporate entrepreneurship is important but
difficult to sustain when the businesses are passed on to later generations (Zahra, 1996;
Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Regarding the ongoing debate over family businesses as
particularly supportive of corporate entrepreneurship, this article not only reaffirms earlier
suggestions (Eddleston et al., 2010) on a manager’s role in determining entrepreneurial
behavior, but enhances our knowledge on entrepreneurial behavior from the angle of
stewardship theory. The agency theoretical literature has long viewed the control mechanism
of corporate governance is critical for reducing principal-agency conflict (Fama and Jensen,
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but what is missing is a conceptual lens to explain the
co-existence of pro-organizational attitude and self-serving motives of managers. Therefore,
instead of focusing on the principle-agent concept, we apply stewardship theory to explain
why some family firms are stagnant while others are entrepreneurial.
5.1 Theoretical Implications
The contribution of this study to the current literature is multifaceted. First, drawing on
Eddleston et al. (2010) theoretical framework, the study empirically inquire after managers’
role in determining explorative orientation. Regarding the empirical support of Hypothesis 1,
we confirm that the three dimensions of stewardship orientation do enhance a firm’s
tendency to pursue explorative activities. Corbetta and Salvato (2004) suggest that agency
costs in family firms could be lower than agency costs in nonfamily firms, not only because
of the combination of ownership and management, but also due to the managers’ pro-
organizational, collectivistic behaviors. Indeed, if reciprocal altruism and stewardship
behavior are present in family firms (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Eddleston and Kellermanns,
2007), a positive impact on entrepreneurial behavior, growth and success of the family firm
can be expected. This finding adds to the family business literature by advocating a
fundamental reframing of governance issues that moves beyond the pure control-monitoring
approach. We contend that steward-like managers serve as a driving force, rather than a
hindrance, to the company-wide entrepreneurial orientation (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004;
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).
With regard to the result of Hypothesis 2, prior studies argue that successful firms are
required to enhance the value of their existing technologies through exploitation, while
simultaneously developing valuable new capabilities through exploration (Levinthal and