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家族企業之興業行為：探究忠僕型經理人、開創性導向以及新產品開發之關係
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1. Introduction
Families in business usually have a deep desire to see their companies prosper and
evolve smoothly into the next generation. However, history is replete with failures of family
businesses in adapting to ever changing environments, especially under the fast pace of
technological progress. As such, corporate entrepreneurship becomes crucial to family
businesses as they need to constantly explore and exploit opportunities which allow them to
compete with advanced technologies, new products or innovative business model (Sirmon
and Hitt, 2003). However, it is often seen that, family firms become vulnerable due to a
smaller pool of talents among family members, and more likely, their unwillingness in
adapting themselves to changing markets (Zahra, 2005; Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, and
Wiwattanakantang, 2011).
Among the discussions on corporate entrepreneurship in family business, there are two
competing perspectives on the entrepreneurial orientation of family businesses. On the one
hand, specific traits of family firms prompt them to develop entrepreneurial behavior
(Aldrich and Cliff, 2003). Studies posit that a strong family-run business culture may foster
the ability to create and maintain entrepreneurship (Hall, Melin, and Nordqvist, 2001;
Salvato, 2004). On the other hand, family firms may suffer from the so-called “generational
shadow” (Davis and Harveston, 1999) or “confining legacy” (Kelly, Athanassiou, and
Crittenden, 2000) because the family successors may become more efficiency driven and
fixated on the previously chosen course. The path dependency could mire them in tradition
and weaken their willingness to take risks associated with explorative actions which deviate
from familiar domains (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006), thereby limiting entrepreneurial
outcomes (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, and Lansberg, 1997; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and
Scholnick, 2008).
On the theoretical front, agency and stewardship theories shed different light on the
above issue. The agency perspective highlights the conflict of interest between owners and
managers, and suggests reducing agency costs through close monitoring or incentives
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). Conversely, the stewardship perspective
considers the role of professional managers in family firms as being important in formulating
and implementing entrepreneurial activities aiming to create new sources of wealth. In
contrast to the principal-agent conflicts, stewardship theory posits that owners and managers
are both motivated by altruism, fairness and pride in their work (Davis, Schoorman, and
Donaldson, 1997); i.e., the extent to which a family business remains entrepreneurial