The Enterprises’ Asymmetric Information, Banking Relationship, and Direct and Indirect Financing

Abstract

This study seeks to theoretically investigate the evolution of heterogeneous firms’ intertemporal banking relationship, as well as direct and indirect financing patterns mainly from the viewpoint of asymmetric information. The micro-foundation theoretical framework delineates that the improvement of enterprises’ asymmetric information problem may result in a less intensive banking relationship. An enterprise with a higher (lower) extent of information asymmetry may have a more intensive (less intensive) banking relationship. An
enterprise with a significant (insignificant) information asymmetry problem is more inclined to select indirect (direct) financing arrangements when its creditworthiness or asymmetric information is improved. Besides, economic expansion (depression) could contribute to a more intensive (less intensive) banking relationship due to lower (higher) financing costs from banks or indirect financing, compared to direct financing. An enterprise with a lower
(higher) extent of information asymmetry is more inclined to have a higher (lower) level of indirect financing during economic expansion. Although direct and indirect financing are substitutes during a given economic state, they are complements in a complete business cycle.