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5

臺大管理論叢

28

卷第

1

these reverse causality issues that may lead to biased ordinary least squares (OLS)

estimates, we employ a two-stage regression analysis Heckman (1979) as the robustness

check. The results remain the same.

The study contributes to a few streams of literature. First, prior studies (e.g., Rego,

2003) argue that firms can avoid taxes through structured transactions among different

entities. We identify a measure, the number of layers, which can serve as organizational

complexity as well as opaque information environment for accelerating corporate tax

avoidance. Second, we contribute to the parent-subsidiary literature. Prior studies

examining tax avoidance activities have traditionally focused on corporate-level

influences (e.g., Rego, 2003). Only few studies to date examine the characteristics of

subsidiaries within a firm (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2012; Shroff, Verdi, and

Yu, 2014). Our study takes a close look at the internal organizational structure of a parent-

subsidiary firm and helps understand the influence of lower organizational levels within

the pyramidal firms on tax avoidance. Third, we contribute to the literature on corporate

pyramids (e.g., Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; La Porta et

al., 1999). The literature on corporate pyramids has so far almost exclusively focused on

the ownership structure and corporate value, and paid little attention to tax activities.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides related literature review and

develops hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the research design. Section 4 describes the

sample selection and descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6

introduces additional analyses, and Section 7 is our conclusion.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

2.1 Corporate Pyramidal Structure

Many firms around the world are organized into pyramid-like structures (La Porta et

al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Khanna and Yafeh, 2005).

Pyramidal ownership structure is defined as a business entity whose ownership structure

displays a top-down chain of control (La Porta et al., 1999). In such a multi-layer

organizational structure, the holding company (i.e., the parent company) at the apex of an

investment structure indirectly controls firms sitting on the lowest tier of investment

structure through intermediate companies. For example, Figure 1 shows the investment

structure of Far Eastern Department Store, with the parent company (Far Eastern

Department Store) indirectly controlling the lowest-tier firm (Beijing Xidan Pacific

Department Stores) at layer 5 through Pacific Current Investment (layer 1), Pacific Chong