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In addition, the submission of call for paper on “Impact of Accounting on Regulation
and Practices” will be closed on July 1, 2017. Guest editors of this special issue are Prof. Liu
Chi-Chun from National Taiwan University and Prof. Huang Hua-Wei (Solomon) from
National Cheng Kung University. This special issue aims for a better understanding of how
accounting affects regulations and practices, calling for creative thinking by innovative and
novel methodologies. All are welcomed to submit. After initial review, candidates for final
acceptance will be invited to a conference on this particular issue held in January, 2018 at
National Taiwan University. Please refer to the announcement for possible topics or check
the latest updates on
NTU Management Review
website for more details.
We also call for submissions of Master Thesis for T. N. Soong Foundation Award. The
submission deadline is in September, 2017. We welcome research papers that can bring new
visions and insights into management theories and practices, and encourage case studies that
depict and interpret management practices.
Introduction of This Edition
This edition of
NTU Management Review
contains nine papers. The following is a brief
introduction of the nine papers. There are five articles related to finance and accounting in
this issue. The first article by Wang, Choi, Li, and Hung studies the effect of the Chinese
government’s split-share structure reform in 2005, using the sample of all companies listed
on the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the years from 2002 to 2013. The
empirical results suggest that after the reform, related party transactions are reduced in firms
controlled by state-owned firms, especially in firms controlled by the central government. In
addition, the second-largest shareholder tends to collude with the controlling shareholders
and increase the use of related party transaction after the reform.
The second paper by Chi, Weng, Liao, and Huang investigates how political
connections affect firm performance. Using a sample of Taiwanese-listed firms from years
2005 to 2011, the authors find that politically-connected firms have lower accounting
performance as well as lower market performance. The results are not affected by the
director’s level of professional knowledge and remains unaffected regardless of different
incentives (including future growth opportunities, financing needs, and tax avoidance) for
politically-connected firms.