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臺大管理論叢

27

卷第

2

29

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

, 25 (4): 409-434. doi: 10.1016/

j.jaccpubpol.2006.05.005

Chaney, P. K., Faccio, M., and Parsley, D. 2011. The quality of accounting information in

politically connected firms.

Journal of Accounting and Economics

, 51 (1-2):

58-76. doi: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.07.003

Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance.

Journal of

Financial Economics

, 87 (1): 157-176. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.006

Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., and Ovtchinnikov, A. V. 2010. Corporate political contributions

and stock returns. 

The Journal of Finance

, 65 (2): 687-724. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-

6261.2009.01548.x

Demsetz, H., and Lehn, K. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and

consequences.

Journal of Political Economy

, 93 (6): 1155-1177. doi: 10.1086/

261354

Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms.

The American Economic Review

, 96 (1): 369-

386. doi: 10.1257/000282806776157704

. 2010. Differences between politically connected and nonconnected firms: A cross-

country analysis.

Financial Management

, 39 (3): 905-928. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-

053X.2010.01099.x

Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control.

The Journal of

Law and Economics

, 26 (2): 301-325. doi: 10.1086/467037

Fan, J. P. H., Wong, T. J., and Zhang, T. 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate

governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms.

Journal of Financial Economics

, 84 (2): 330-357. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.

2006.03.008

Fich, E. M., and Shivdasani, A. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors?.

The Journal of

Finance

, 61 (2): 689-724. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.x

Frye, T., and Shleifer, A. 1997. The invisible hand and the grabbing hand.

The American

Economic Review

, 87 (2): 354-358.

Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., and So, J. 2009. Do politically connected boards affect firm value?.

The Review of Financial Studies

, 22 (6): 2331-2360. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhn088

Goyal, V. K., and Park, C. W. 2002. Board leadership structure and CEO turnover.

Journal

of Corporate Finance

, 8 (1): 49-66. doi: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00028-1

Gul, F. A. 2006. Auditors’ response to political connections and cronyism in Malaysia.

Journal of Accounting Research

, 44 (5): 931-963. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.

2006.00220.x