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363
臺大管理論叢
2016/12
第
27
卷第
1
期
363-394
DOI:10.6226/NTUMR.2016.MAR.D104-025
審計委員會權益薪酬之決定因素
摘 要
由於權益薪酬之使用漸趨廣泛，其相關討論增加，再加上審計委員會職責逐漸加重等因
素，促使本研究欲找出哪些因素使得公司給予其審計委員會成員權益薪酬。研究發現代
理問題較嚴重之公司傾向不給予權益薪酬。薪酬委員會中成員同時為審計委員會成員之
比例則與給予權益薪酬之可能性呈顯著正向關係。而審計委員會中董事同時為其他公司
之高階主管之比例越高則公司傾向不給予權益薪酬。本研究期能對審計委員會成員權益
薪酬之相關議題做進一步的補充，幫助釐清採用權益薪酬之決定因素。
【關鍵字】
公司治理、審計委員會、權益薪酬、代理問題
Abstract
The controversy around the rising use of equity-based compensation for audit committee
members and the enhanced responsibilities of audit committee is the basis for this study to
examine the factors that affect a firm’s use of stocks and stock options to remunerate audit
committee members. Our results show that firms having more severe agency conflicts are
less likely to give equity-based compensation to audit committee members. Furthermore,
firms with more compensation committee members sitting on the audit committee are
significantly more likely to compensate audit committee members with stocks and stock
options. Moreover, when more audit committee members are also top managers of other
companies, the probability of equity remuneration for audit committee members is lower.
Given that prior studies find that equity-based compensation for audit committee members is
associated with earnings management, accounting restatement, and internal control
weakness, our study contributes to the literature by identifying the factors that contribute to
the use of equity-based compensation for audit committee members.
【
Keywords
】
corporate governance, audit committee, equity-based compensation, agency
conflicts
The Determinants of Equity Compensation for Audit Committee
Members
賴運霆
/
德州大學達拉斯分校會計碩士生
Yun-Ting Lai
, Master Student, Department of Accounting, University of Texas at Dallas
吳淑鈴
/
國立臺灣大學會計學系助理教授
Shu-Ling Wu
, Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, National Taiwan University
Received 2015/8, Final revision received 2016/3