臺大管理論叢 NTU Management Review VOL.29 NO.3

A special thank you goes to Dr. Samuel Yin, President of Ruentex Financial Group, who partially sponsored NTUMR under the Yin-Xun-Ruo Educational Foundation, allowing our journal to continuously publish distinguished publications. Our appreciation also goes out to the Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Science, Ministry of Science and Technology ( 科技部人文社會科學研究中心 ), for sponsoring the hiring of editorial assistants, who have provided invaluable assistance. Last but not least, we would like to thank T. N. Soong Foundation for their continuous support. To encourage research in accounting, auditing, finance, taxation, information, and management in Taiwan, the Foundation has been sponsoring the Best Master's Thesis Award since 1996. Several winning papers have been published by NTUMR ever since. Introduction of this Edition This edition of NTU Management Review contains seven articles. The following is a brief introduction to all of them. The article in the field of marketing management by Chen, Chou, Huang, and Zeng explores these issues: how consumers' information structure and the nature of advertising media may affect an incumbent manufacturer's and a potential entrant's incentives to perform informative advertising, how these advertising decisions may affect the two manufacturers' subsequent pricing behavior, and thus how would the potential entrant's entry decision be influenced. Several interesting results are observed when consumer gross valuations are high enough. First, the incumbent's informative advertising through mass media would help deter entry, except in the case where the incumbent manufacturer is endowed with a fairly large loyal base. Second, if informative advertising fails to deter entry and that neither of the firms has a dominant loyal base, the post-entry price competition crucially depends on the nature of the advertising medium used by the two firms. Furthermore, the informative advertising performed by the incumbent would intensify their price competition if both use similar mass media that have high reach. Third, both firms would use similar mass media should they wish to perform informative advertising, which would discourage the incumbent manufacturers from conducting informative advertising in equilibrium. Lastly, the