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臺大管理論叢
第
27
卷第
3
期
13
achieved by superior or unique product performance and patented technologies resulting
from strong process innovation capabilities (Swink and Hegarty, 1998). The follower can
then effectively defend itself against quick retaliations from the leader. In other words, its
self-invented capabilities can create learning barriers for the leader. Formally,
l
=
O
‧
v
i
,
(14)
where
v
i
reflects the effectiveness of developing innovation capabilities, such as the
ability to integrate the innovation with a wider range of process capabilities.
Generally, the follower firm prefers to see the leader’s process as a benchmark and as a
target goal, largely due to the great achievement, high visibility, and institutionalization of
this process (Ferrier et al., 1999). In particular, intensive competition forces the follower to
take an imitative strategy to avoid falling behind other rivals in the market which rewards
fast responders (Rahmandad, 2012). To be fast, the follower then must limit its action to only
small-scale process improvements (Repening and Sterman, 2002; Rahmandad, Repenning,
and Sterman, 2009). In other words, the strong competitive tension limits the follower
because of the survival pressure, and thus it will choose to concentrate on the logical
competitive advantage option of developing process improvement capabilities:
V
= (1 –
z
)
D
,
(15)
where
z
reflects the followerʼs resource percentage invested in process innovation
capabilities. This tension reflects the capability development trade-off; given the total
resources, an increase in innovation capability means a decrease in improvement capability.
Alternative formulations for modeling diverse trade-offs are discussed in the next section.
When there is not enough resource similarity to support continuous process improvement,
the follower needs to switch to search for new opportunities (Schmenner and Swink, 1998). To
illustrate this, Toyota’s Just-in-Time process was, remarkably, largely the firm’s response to the
historical imperative and its low resource similarity of MPS firms (Fujimoto, 1999).
Meanwhile, established MPS firms, acknowledging Toyotaʼs weaknesses, did not treat it as a
major competitor (threat) (Womack et al., 1990). Likewise, such ‘constraints’ on the follower
side can single-handedly generates a less intensely competitive environment, reduce the
leaderʼs retaliation threat, and facilitate the follower’s process innovation: