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臺大管理論叢

26

卷第

2

3

For example, before the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) defined malicious tax evasion as

illegal, Ernst & Young provided this tax service to 132 clients, its competitive tax shelter

being contingent deferred swap. The main idea behind this tax-avoidance strategy is shifting

operating income to capital gains which has a lower tax ratio. In August 2005, KPMG

publicly acknowledged that they had peddled tax shelters to their clients and agreed to pay a

fine of $456 million.

It seems that external audit firms forget their auditing roles when providing tax services

to their clients. However, from the perspective of risk control, external auditors should

constrain clients’ tax avoidance when taking on auditor duties (Maydew and Shackelford,

2007). Overall, the question about auditor’s role in clients’ tax avoidance activity is still

open. This paper investigates the association between auditor industry expertise and clients’

tax avoidance and whether this association is affected by auditor independence. Although a

number of studies have investigated the influence of auditor industry expertise on audit

quality or audit pricing (e.g., Gul, Fung, and Jaggi, 2009; Reichelt and Wang, 2010; Francis,

Reichelt, and Wang, 2005), evidence on the association between auditor industry expertise

and tax avoidance is scarce. It is not clear whether auditor industry expertise is associated

with greater tax avoidance, because auditor industry expertise influences tax avoidance from

both tax and audit perspectives. From a tax perspective, industry experts are associated with

greater tax avoidance because experts have a better understanding of industry-specific

opportunities for avoiding tax, and may use their expertise to develop tax strategies that

benefit clients. From an audit perspective, due to the complexities of tax laws and risk

control principles, industry experts are more likely to find and deter tax avoidance activity by

requiring adjustments that limit the associated financial statement benefits.

2

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of auditor industry expertise on

tax avoidance. Considering the intense competition in the Chinese audit market, this study

further investigates whether the association between auditor expertise and tax avoidance is

affected by auditor independence. Using 2008-2012 A-share listed companies in Shanghai

and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as research sample, this paper demonstrates that an auditor

who is an industry expert is more likely to help its client engage in tax avoidance activity,

2 For example, some tax avoidance activities (such as creating a permanent difference to reduce tax

expense) will attract auditor’s attention, especially when the auditor is an industry expert. If the auditor

does not believe the tax strategy will withstand the scrutiny of the relevant tax authorities, he/she may

require the client to adjust the accounting process and therefore reduce tax avoidance.