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Goal Consensus, Subordinates’ Prior Performances, and Supervisors’ Resource Allocation Preferences

to distribute resources to subordinates who show similar interests (goals) to increase
collective success through activities that strengthen their capacity and resolve against
others’ interests in order to protect their own interests (Mithani and O’Brien, 2021).
However, in the social interactions between supervisors and subordinates, neither of

the parties plays a completely passive role. Supervisors and subordinates build not only
on their own roles in the social relationship but also the other party’s corresponding role
in that same relationship (Hsiung and Lee, 2021). Differentiated resource allocation may

cause some subordinates to circuitously reduce their job performance and their altruism
toward colleagues, which may reduce collaboration, low product quality and deteriorate
overall performance (Xu, Huang, Lam, and Miao, 2012). This scenario may possible
to deter supervisors to distribute resource that only contingent on their own preferred
goals or interest. However, because the power differentials between a supervisor and a

subordinated, an act of direct retaliation by a subordinate may trigger even greater hostility
form the offending supervisor (Tepper, Moss, and Duffy, 2011). As a result, subordinates
who receive unequitable resource may remain silence and accept such differentiation.

In summary, in the setting of our research site, a regional manager has his own
preferred goals. The favored goals of a regional manager reveal either his own preferences
or the priority that the regional manager considers essential for his own region. In both
cases, however, the regional manager’s preferred goals are subjectively absolute, because
the regional manager allows neither discrimination among alternative preferences nor the

possibility that he might perceive his own priorities and actions as morally distressing
(March, 1991; Shapira, 2002). The regional manager is, therefore, more likely to perceive
his preferred goals to be important and to prioritize his acts in pursuit of his preferred

goals. Since resources are limited within the region, to increase the possibility of achieving
his preferred goals, he will have the incentive to distribute more resources to branch
managers who have similar goal priorities in order to strengthen their capacity and protect
their own interests. Therefore, we argue that branch managers with cohesive goals are
more likely to receive more resources than branch managers with incohesive goals. This

leads to our first hypothesis (H1):
H1: The greater the degree of goal consensus, the more resources received by the branch
manager’s office, and vice versa.

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