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257

臺大管理論叢

28

卷第

1

(Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; McMullen, Raghunandan,

and Rama, 1996; Eilifsen and Messier, 2000; Leone, 2007; Rice and Weber, 2012), we

regard restatement companies (non-restatement companies) as those that are more (less)

likely to have material weaknesses and thus, are more (less) likely to receive adverse

ICFR opinions. We presume that deterioration in ICFR-disclosure quality is shown by an

increase in the likelihood of Type II errors (i.e., a restatement company fails to conclude

that its internal control system is ineffective for the restated period) or an increase in the

likelihood of Type I errors (i.e., a non-restatement company concludes that its internal

control system is ineffective for the non-restatement period).

First, we focus our investigation on the effect of SOX 404. In comparison with SOX

302, additional management documentation and auditor scrutiny over ICFR required by

SOX 404 might help detect and lead to disclosure of underlying internal control problems

and thus, reduce Type II errors. However, required signatures of auditors on opinions

regarding ICFR may make auditors unduly cautious in identifying material weaknesses.

Their low thresholds for material weaknesses could result in many reported material

weaknesses that do not lead to misstatements (Doyle, Ge, and McVay, 2007a), which in

turn, may increase the likelihood of making Type I errors. The results of our study show

that restatement companies subject to SOX 404 are less likely to conclude that their ICFR

is effective than those subjected to SOX 302. In the non-restatement sample, we found no

differences in the likelihood of concluding that the company’s ICFR is ineffective between

companies subjected to SOX 404 and those subjected to SOX 302. Therefore, the

enactment of SOX 404 reduces Type II errors of ICFR disclosures without increasing

Type I errors.

Next, we turn our focus to the effect of AS5 on ICFR-disclosure quality. As

mentioned previously, the PCAOB amended AS2 and proposed AS5 for achieving an

optimal balance between the costs and benefits of ICFR audits. By eliminating

unnecessary procedures and testing in audits of internal controls, AS5 emphasizes

reallocating resources to important and high-risk areas (SEC, 2007). We expect that AS5

has improved not only the efficiency but also the efficacy of audits of internal controls and

thereby, has reduced ICFR-disclosure errors, including both Type I and Type II errors.

However, concerns exist over the controversial risk-based audit approach adopted in AS5

because it might give auditors more latitude in their professional judgment. Risk-based

audit approaches have been associated with some highly visible audit failures (e.g.,