臺大管理論叢 NTU Management Review VOL.29 NO.1

Post-Disaster Grain Supply Chain Management with Supplier Hoarding and Regime Intervention 40 6.2 Insights of Management According to the above analytical results, we can summarize several important managerial implications as follows. First, we prove that regime intervention is beneficial in alleviating the supplier’s inclination towards hoarding behavior. Through selling grains to the market or purchasing grains from the market, the regime can intervene publicly in the grain supply chain and consumer market. We may regard the regime as a supplier which always provides the lowest prices in the market. Thus, the other suppliers in the grain supply chain will comprehend that it is impossible to earn an opportunistic payoff from the disrupted grain supply chain. Since 2004, the Chinese regime has regulated the minimum purchase prices for wheat and rice (Yang et al., 2008). Moreover, regime compensation is another effective method in strengthening the resilience of the grain supply chain. In many countries, the most important goal of agricultural policy is stabilizing the grain prices. When Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines a few years ago; the regime had provided sufficient supply of rice to prevent the price of commodities from rising steeply (Evans, 2011; Alegado, 2013). Collaboration efforts can help the regime be seen as a trusted third party among distributors and retailers. The mutual objective is to alleviate the negative consequences of disrupted agricultural production. To investigate the effects of collaboration, we applied the empirical results to suppliers whose relationship quality with the regime are highest. 6.3 Conclusion and Future Research In this study, we proposed a research model to describe the relationship between a supplier’s hoarding intention after disaster and the moderating effects of the regime. Additionally, this theoretical framework is mainly derived from a notable theory of consumer behavior, the theory of reasoned action (TRA), which is supported by self- interest orientation (Bandura, 1977, 1986), inter-firm relationship management (Cropanzano et al., 2005), and social cognitive theory. We found that the empirical model successfully verifies the relationship between supplier hoarding intentions and regime intervention. We suggest regimes take action during the production stage to increase recovery capabilities of a disrupted grain supply chain. The regime plays an important role in assisting with the recovery of a disrupted supply chain post-disaster. While the focus of this study is the supplier’s hoarding intentions, further research can widen the scope of this study by integrating other factors, such as social norms (Wu, 1995), supply chain contingency quality, collusions between the upstream and downstream chains, as well as by investigating into the topic of grain supply chain management.