臺大管理論叢 NTU Management Review VOL.29 NO.1

33 NTU Management Review Vol. 29 No. 1 Apr. 2019 3.3 Perceived Relationship Quality in Main Business Partner We dispute that “perceived relationship quality in main business partner” mainly affects the supplier hoarding intention from the viewpoint of managing inter- organizational relationship quality and the subjective norm of theory of reasoned action (TRA). In TRA, people’s behavioral intention is affected by subjective norms (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991, 2005). Generally, various vertically coordinated firms are efficient at reducing costs, sharing risks, and enhancing mutual competitive advantages. According to Bowersox, Closs, and Cooper (2013)’s perspective, the members of a supply chain cooperate whether they stay in upstream or downstream business operations. Hence, we assume that perceived atmosphere of relationship quality in a marketing channel is identified by shared belief (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh, 1987), interpersonal relationship (Jap, Manolis, and Weitz, 1999), and channel atmosphere (Hu and Sheu, 2005; Chou, 2009). Decision makers might consider those factors when managing supply chains. Additionally, relationships involving multiple buyers/sellers are normally quite common and are regularly named “partnerships” by the parties involved. However, the switching costs in some relationships tend to be very high, especially in highly concentrated agriculture food industries. Relationships between independent retailers and small scale processors usually maintain long-term partnerships. (Fischer, Gonzalez, Henchion, and Leat, 2007). Thus, “perceived relationship quality in main business partner” is correlated with “hoarding intention of supplier”. We propose this hypothesis as follow: H3. A supplier’s perceived relationship quality in main business partner is negatively correlated with the supplier’s hoarding intention after disaster. 3.4 Regime Intervention As regime intervention has an influence on grain suppliers’ attitudes during post- disaster recovery, we argue that operational impact reduction and expectation of future earnings from the supplier could be moderated by the regime. The regime seeks to stabilize grain prices by building up resilience of the supply chain. (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). To reach this purpose, the regime uses various methods to prevent the fluctuation of the grain market. These methods are beneficial to grain suppliers who suffered from supply disruption problems (Simchi-Levi, Schmidt, and Wei, 2014). It is hypothesized that: H1a. Regime intervention in grain supply markets weakens the relationship between a grain supplier’s belief in future earnings and the supplier’s hoarding intention after a disaster.