臺大管理論叢 NTU Management Review VOL.29 NO.1

307 NTU Management Review Vol. 29 No. 1 Apr. 2019 Non-S&P 1,500 banks Independent Variable 1992-2012 1992-2006 2007-2012 1992-2012 1992-2006 2007-2012 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) Constant 0.065 0.090 -0.019 0.056 0.069 0.002 (2.55)** (2.84)*** (-0.42) (2.10)** (2.11)** (0.04) CashBonus i,t-1 0.003 0.005 0.0002 0.001 0.002 -0.002 (0.45) (0.59) (0.02) (0.16) (0.27) (-0.14) EquityIncentive ($) i,t-1 -0.007 -0.013 0.0002 (-1.00) (-1.55) (0.01) EquityRiskExposure ($) i,t-1 0.004 0.002 0.010 (0.65) (0.31) (0.99) EquityIncentive (%) i,t-1 0.002 0.007 -0.014 (0.30) (0.90) (-1.40) EquityRiskExposure (%) i,t-1 0.005 0.004 0.007 (0.72) (0.46) (0.73) LoanCommitment i,t-1 0.796 0.826 0.724 0.831 0.865 0.742 (16.71)*** (14.59)*** (8.03)*** (16.73)*** (14.78)*** (8.10)*** DepositBase i,t-1 1.372 1.444 1.056 1.490 1.594 1.081 (13.99)*** (12.33)*** (6.22)*** (14.12)*** (12.55)*** (6.18)*** LoanCommitment i,t-1 * DepositBase i,t-1 -5.885 -6.254 -4.568 -6.640 -7.113 -5.041 (-12.64)*** (-11.64)*** (-4.76)*** (-12.45)*** (-11.43)*** (-4.89)*** BankCapital i,t-1 -0.466 -0.532 -0.198 -0.419 -0.483 -0.205 (-3.56)*** (-3.49)*** (-0.78) (-2.98)*** (-2.92)*** (-0.80) Share of Deposit Financing i,t-1 -0.016 -0.039 0.061 -0.019 -0.038 0.048 (-0.56) (-1.19) (1.20) (-0.69) (-1.13) (0.94) BusinessCycle t-1 -0.069 -0.075 -0.924 0.001 0.003 -0.852 (-0.43) (-0.21) (-3.44)*** (0.01) (0.01) (-3.15)*** Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 762 572 190 744 561 183 R-square 0.423 0.424 0.497 0.425 0.431 0.484 F test of excluded instruments (61.24)*** (45.99)*** (19.74)*** (60.40)*** (46.34)*** (18.06)*** also investigated for the whole research period and the sub-periods. Panel A of Table 11 shows that the coefficients of liquidity across all regressions in the pre-financial crisis period for the whole sample were all significant. The results of the sub-sample analyses, shown in panels B and C, indicate that most of the results were from the S&P 1,500 banks. The empirical results from Table 12 are quantitatively similar to the results reported in Table 11: They indicate that banks with higher CEO incentives tended to hold higher levels of liquidity, which also resulted in higher bank performance.