臺大管理論叢 NTU Management Review VOL.29 NO.1

297 NTU Management Review Vol. 29 No. 1 Apr. 2019 3. CEO equity incentive (%) 4. CEO equity risk exposure ($) 5. CEO equity risk exposure (%) 1992-2012 1992-2006 2007- 2012 1992- 2012 1992- 2006 2007- 2012 1992- 2012 1992- 2006 2007- 2012 10.24 12.07 6.79 9.42 13.16 0.69 10.24 13.24 3.31 (88.44)*** (101.91)*** (38.02)*** (14.87)*** (42.80)*** (0.37) (18.93)*** (48.27)*** (2.10)** 10.22 12.33 6.32 4.45 11.82 -11.24 3.49 11.69 -14.11 (83.94)*** (101.73)*** (35.03)*** (3.09)*** (38.34)*** (-2.62)*** (2.31)** (34.70)*** (-3.15)*** 0.01 -0.26 0.47 4.97 1.34 11.92 6.75 1.55 17.42 (0.08) (-1.51) (1.85)* (3.16)*** (3.08)*** (2.55)** (4.21)*** (3.56)*** (3.67)*** 11.31 12.36 6.97 11.93 15.01 0.43 12.38 14.73 5.99 (43.44)*** (46.99)*** (19.55)*** (13.31)*** (36.16)*** (0.13) (26.37)*** (36.61)*** (6.38)*** 11.15 12.75 5.92 1.63 13.80 -15.83 -0.43 14.15 -25.88 (46.19)*** (57.05)*** (18.68)*** (0.44) (29.43)*** (-1.82)* (-0.10) (28.48)*** (-2.33)** 0.16 -0.39 1.05 10.30 1.21 16.26 12.81 0.58 31.87 (1.24) (-1.12) (2.20)** (2.69)*** (1.93)* (1.74)* (2.95)*** (0.91) (2.85)*** 9.97 11.73 6.66 8.42 12.28 0.75 9.29 12.53 2.30 (77.73)*** (88.62)*** (33.07)*** (10.44)*** (30.80)*** (0.35) (12.39)*** (35.78)*** (1.07) 9.84 11.69 6.26 5.40 11.27 -9.06 4.64 11.03 -9.98 (70.81)*** (81.43)*** (29.86)*** (3.69)*** (30.70)*** (-1.88)* (3.12)*** (27.61)*** (-2.16)** 0.12 0.04 0.40 3.02 1.02 9.81 4.65 1.49 12.28 (0.66)* (0.18) (1.38) (1.81)* (1.87)* (1.86)* (2.79)*** (2.81)*** (2.41)** during the whole research period. The effect of CEO equity risk exposure on the level of liquidity holding became stronger after the financial crisis, indicating that banks tended to hold a higher proportion of liquidity as their CEOs equity portfolios were more sensitive to changes in stock return volatility after the financial crisis. Panels B and C further show that the significantly positive linkage between CEO incentives and bank liquidity holdings mainly existed in the S&P 1,500 banks.