臺大管理論叢 NTU Management Review VOL.29 NO.1

29 NTU Management Review Vol. 29 No. 1 Apr. 2019 supplier with limited capacity, and a steady, certain and more costly supplier with quantity elasticity (Hu et al., 2013). The consumer’s best solution is determined by supplier characteristics, which include disruption magnitude, capacity flexibility, risk bias, and product price (Tomlin, 2006; Chopra, Reinhardt, and Mohan, 2007; Xanthopoulos, Vlachos, and Iakovou, 2012). By contrast, contingent sourcing refers to a buyer ordering from suppliers sequentially, and is quite different from dual sourcing. A backup vender will be regarded as a contingent source if the main supplier fails to complete the order. (Qi, 2013). Reviewing recent literature on the management of disruption uncertainties of grain supply chains, we found minor studies investigating the regime aid for grain supply chain recovery. Regime aid in the grain supply chain works as an instrument to stabilize the domestic price (Riethmuller and Roe, 1986). In India, the regime intervenes with food approval process rather than directly intervening in the increasing grain prices (Pal, Bahl, and Mruthyunjaya, 1993). The Japanese regime regulates prices indirectly for grain productions to modify working environments of farmers (Vitanov, Sakai, Jordanov, Managi, and Demura, 2007). The Chinese regime issued policies to fight price fluctuations in the grain market and achieve an equilibrium between demand and supply (Yang et al., 2008). Grain production, grain circulation, and grain sales are the three phases in a classic logistical progress of the supply chain. In the grain production phase, measures such as lowest purchase price and grain premiums could be used to help producers (Yang et al., 2008). Fan, Wailes, and Cramer (1994) claimed that different phases implement different strategies. In the grain circulation phase, the regime intervenes with the grain supply chain members’ behavior in these following procedures: stockpiling, shipping, processing, and selling. In the grain sale phase, the Chinese regime maintains equilibrium between end- consumer’s demand and grain supply. Once shortage happens in the grain markets, the regime delivers stockpiled grains to the market in a timely manner (Yang et al., 2008). Apparently, the regime may alleviate the risk of a disrupted supply chain by serving as a backup supplier. We have noticed a gap in these studies in the existing literature. First, it seems that the regime often intervenes the market after a disaster to enhance the recovery of the disrupted supply chain. However, the phenomenon is hardly explored in the existing literature. Moreover, it is thought that grain productions are vital for everyone around the world. If grain demand is expected to significantly exceed grain supply, the hoarding