臺大管理論叢第31卷第1期

97 NTU Management Review Vol. 31 No. 1 Apr. 2021 Dep: CAR(-2,+2) (1) (2) (3) (4) Full Sample All-Cash Deals Within Industry Sample Within Industry & All-Cash Deals Salest-1 Market_to_Bookt-1 EBITDA/TAt-1 Stock returnt-1 Industry M&A liquidityt-1 Herfindahl indext-1 Market leveraget-1 Relative Sizet Private Targett Within-industry acquisitiont All Casht Competedt Hostilet InsideOwnt-1 Intercept -0.000682 (-0.47) -0.00107 (-0.63) 0.0257 (1.12) 0.00286 (0.60) -0.0524 (-1.49) -0.00184 (-0.25) 0.00733 (0.54) 0.00499*** (2.87) 0.0200*** (4.42) 0.00304 (1.00) 0.00619* (1.92) -0.0173 (-1.51) -0.00793 (-0.32) -0.0000840 (-0.21) -0.0250 (-1.08) -0.00230 (-0.96) -0.00342 (-1.30) 0.0000521 (0.00) 0.00151 (0.21) -0.0923* (-1.83) 0.00957 (0.93) 0.0113 (0.45) 0.00896*** (3.26) 0.00760 (1.32) 0.00399 (0.87) -0.0265* (-1.93) -0.000653 (-1.36) 0.00506 (0.13) -0.000634 (-0.30) -0.00248 (-1.05) 0.0333 (1.16) 0.00919 (1.40) -0.109* (-1.94) 0.00120 (0.10) 0.00972 (0.53) 0.00604** (2.51) 0.0208*** (3.19) 0.00860* (1.82) -0.0196 (-1.14) -0.0344 (-0.68) -0.000384 (-0.76) -0.0353 (-1.05) -0.00245 (-0.65) -0.00485 (-1.46) 0.0149 (0.36) 0.00819 (0.78) -0.191** (-2.05) 0.0325* (1.87) 0.00533 (0.17) 0.0135*** (3.63) 0.00239 (0.25) -0.0306 (-1.38) -0.000922 (-1.62) -0.0170 (-0.27) Year fixed effect Number of observations R-squared Yes 1,890 0.054 Yes 804 0.083 Yes 957 0.069 Yes 397 0.165 Note: The table investigates how the market responds to the M&A decision induced by the incentive compensation. All variables are defined in the same way as shown in the Appendix. The results are estimated by the OLS regression model with standard errors that are robust and control for time and firm clustering. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 5 Announcement Effect for ESOs-Induced M&A Decisions (cont.)

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