104 Executive Stock Options, Corporate Cash Holdings and M&A Decisions Table 8 The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Long-Term Performance (cont.) Panel B: Industry-Adjusted M/B Dep: IAM/B t+1 Well Governed Firms Poorly Governed Firms (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) Full Sample All-Cash Deals Within Industry Deals Full Sample All-Cash Deals Within Industry Deals Intercept IAM/B t-1 MA t Vega t-1 Delta t-1 Cashrich t-1 . Vega×Cashrich Delta×Cashrich Vega×Cashrich×MA P-value on the diff. in Well vs. Poor Delta×Cashrich×MA Sales t-1 Aveleverage Avesalegrowth 0.183 (1.32) 0.741*** (29.27) -0.175*** (-5.19) 0.0525 (0.38) -0.00667 (-0.24) 0.0537 (1.60) -0.227 (-1.05) 0.0218 (0.48) 0.188 (0.40) 0.284 0.0876 (0.91) 0.0396*** (2.81) -0.297*** (-3.70) -0.317*** (-3.29) 0.216 (1.49) 0.740*** (28.47) -0.186*** (-4.15) 0.0816 (0.56) -0.00318 (-0.11) 0.0623* (1.80) -0.253 (-1.15) 0.0179 (0.38) 0.106 (0.19) 0.071 0.165 (1.18) 0.0370** (2.56) -0.298*** (-3.64) -0.325*** (-3.24) 0.121 (0.55) 0.734*** (28.26) -0.172*** (-3.53) 0.0177 (0.12) 0.00150 (0.05) 0.0643* (1.85) -0.204 (-0.94) 0.0128 (0.28) 0.348 (0.50) 0.038 -0.0233 (-0.24) 0.0394*** (2.73) -0.310*** (-3.78) -0.300*** (-2.98) 0.0122 (0.07) 0.662*** (21.29) -0.0688** (-2.04) -0.0191 (-0.18) 0.0420 (1.30) 0.110*** (3.14) 0.0431 (0.22) -0.0727 (-1.19) -0.543 (-1.04) -0.186 (-1.51) 0.0193 (1.59) -0.432*** (-4.23) -0.402*** (-3.95) 0.166 (0.71) 0.671*** (20.85) -0.0135 (-0.25) -0.0631 (-0.58) 0.0379 (1.15) 0.113*** (3.10) 0.0532 (0.27) -0.0759 (-1.24) -1.160*** (-2.70) -0.108 (-0.89) 0.0195 (1.57) -0.430*** (-4.07) -0.424*** (-4.21) 0.191 (0.75) 0.662*** (20.29) -0.0450 (-0.85) -0.0498 (-0.48) 0.0515 (1.51) 0.118*** (3.20) 0.0668 (0.34) -0.0863 (-1.38) -1.779** (-2.27) 0.114 (0.76) 0.0166 (1.32) -0.449*** (-4.22) -0.421*** (-4.07) Year fixed effect Number of observations R-squared Yes 3,479 0.610 Yes 3,275 0.612 Yes 3,268 0.608 Yes 3,105 0.565 Yes 2,856 0.569 Yes 2,887 0.565 Note: The table examines whether the governance environment matters to the one-year future performance for cash-rich firms undertaking the ESOs-induced M&As. All variables are defined in the same way as shown in the Appendix. A firm is defined as well governed firms if the firm has a positive insider ownership (InsideOwn >0); otherwise, a firm is classified as poorly governed firms. Panels A and B demonstrate the analyses base on different performance measures. The results are estimated based on the OLS regression model with standard errors that are robust and control for firm and time clustering. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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