臺大管理論叢 NTU Management Review VOL.28 NO.3

Does CEO Career Horizon Lead to Corporate Misconduct? Evidence of Taiwanese Semiconductor Firms 160 Table 2 The Results of Negative Binominal Regression Models N = 1124 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Constant 1.153 (1.572) -23.182 (9.424) -23.020* (9.502) Firm size -0.062* (0.025) -0.046 † (0.027) -0.045 † (0.027) ROA -0.013 (0.018) -0.009 (0.018) -0.009 (0.017) ROE -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) Board independence 0.248 (1.406) 1.028 (1.454) 0.987 (1.451) Board national diversity -3.382 † (2.055) -4.184* (2.023) -4.029* (2.058) Board ownership -0.011 (0.013) -0.009 (0.012) -0.009 (0.012) CEO duality 0.089 (0.834) 0.337 (0.860) 0.293 (0.865) CEO overconfidence 0.965** (0.294) 1.017** (0.301) 1.030** (0.301) CEO ownership 0.151 † (0.078) 0.128 † (0.076) 0.125 (0.076) CEO tenure -0.043 (0.043) -0.061 (0.043) -0.061 (0.043) CEO career horizon 0.780* (0.324) 0.793* (0.328) CEO career horizon 2 -0.006* (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) Board size (BS) -0.049 (0.105) Board functional diversity (BFD) CCH × BS CCH × BFD Log likelihood -126.714 -122.434 -122.325 Wald χ ² 22.46* 29.96** 29.83** Note: † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Standard errors are in parentheses.